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Abstract
Nowadays, the improvements in obtaining and processing information and the development of
big data are increasingly important matters both from an ethical and an economic viewpoint.
On the one hand, such phenomena imply the access to individuals’ sensitive information and
raise issues concerning their privacy. On the other hand, firms show clear-cut incentives to
engage in targeting strategies. Personalised rebates, bring-a-friend rewards, targeted prices in
online social networks are all examples of how the knowledge of some precise characteristics
of clients and of their social network are powerful tools in the hands of firms.
The goal of this thesis is to analyse some of these strategies, with the final objective to provide
some theoretical explanation of the incentives of firms to use them and how the distribution of
surplus is a↵ected by them. The manuscript is divided into three chapters, each one readable
as a distinct paper. The first two chapters investigate the consequences of pricing policies
based on the past purchase behaviour of consumers in markets characterised by horizontal
and vertical di↵erentiation (Chapter 1) and by cross-group network externalities (Chapter 2),
whereas the third one proposes a network-based analysis of referral bonuses (Chapter 3).
In addition to current literature, the first paper presents a two-period model which demon-
strates that, as soon as a certain level of vertical di↵erentiation is reached, firms converge
to asymmetric pricing behaviours. The strong seller adopts a margin-focusing strategy and
the low-quality rival conquers most of the market. As a consequence, customers only move
from the low-quality to the high-quality firm (One-Direction Switching, ODS) and, in most
of the cases, the former exits the market. If consumers are myopic, the ODS scenario is detri-
mental for them and beneficial for firms in relation to uniform pricing. If instead consumers
are forward-looking, they and the low-quality firm are better o↵ and the high-quality firm is
worse o↵ when BBPD is viable.
The second paper presents a model of two-sided markets a` la Armstrong in which, after a
first round of purchases, platforms are allowed to price-discriminate in the subscribers’ side.
The main findings are two. On the one hand, the model shows that stronger cross-group
externalities make two-direction switching less probable. On the other hand, second-period
competition is strengthened compared to the case in which a uniform price is charged in both
sides of the market, whereas in the first period it is relaxed if the subscribers exhibit stronger
externalities than firms. The overall e↵ect of BBPD on the inter-temporal profits of platforms
is unambiguously negative, confirming the previous results of the one-sided literature.
Chapter 31 is motivated by the observation of the practice of firms to o↵er referral bonuses
to customers and presents a two-period model in which a monopolist sells a non-durable
good to a partially uninformed population of consumers embedded in a social network. From
the theoretical point of view, the o↵er of the bonus a↵ects individual incentives of people to
speak, as speaking is seen as a costly investment in exchange for an uncertain return. The
model allows for the determination of a cuto↵ of minimal degree required to speak about the
product. The level of the bonus strongly depends on the distribution of connections in the
social network. In random networks, roughly the most popular half of informed consumers
invests, regardless of network density. On the contrary, in scale-free networks the monopolist
faces a clear-cut decision between maximising margins and maximising demand. The optimal
choice depends on the probability of observing highly-connected individuals and, in scale-free
networks empirically observed, the first alternative would be preferred.
1This paper is a joint work with Simone Righi, MTA TK ”Lendu¨let” Research Center for Educational and Network
Studies (RECENS), Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Dipartimento di Economia ”Marco Biagi” Universita` di Modena
e Reggio Emilia.
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dommo de prusu, prenada’e allegrias... Elias, Elias
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1Competitive Behaviour-Based Price
Discrimination among Asymmetric
Firms
Abstract
This article studies the e↵ects of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD) in a horizontally and
vertically di↵erentiated duopoly. In a two-period model, firms are allowed to condition their pricing
policies on the past purchase behaviour of consumers. The paper shows two di↵erent types of equilibria
depending on the strength of vertical di↵erentiation. If the di↵erence in quality is small enough, both
firms steal each other’s consumers (Two-Direction Switching) and su↵er a situation in which prices and
profits are lower and the consumer surplus increases. When quality di↵erentials are instead substantial,
asymmetric behaviours arise: the high-quality firm sells its product to few consumers at a high price in
the first period and then becomes aggressive in the second one. As a consequence, customers only move
from the low-quality to the high-quality firm (One-Direction Switching, ODS) and, in most of the cases,
the former exits the market. If consumers are myopic, the ODS scenario is detrimental for them and
beneficial for firms in relation to uniform pricing . If instead consumers are forward-looking, they and
the low-quality firm are better o↵ and the high-quality firm is worse o↵ when BBPD is viable.
1.1 Introduction
Customer’s recognition represents an increasingly important matter in economics. Indeed, the devel-
opment of big data and the availability to firms of consumers’ sensible information have raised issues
concerning consumers’ privacy. Moreover, the improvements in obtaining and processing such informa-
tion enable firms to infer preferences of consumers and to discriminate based on their past purchase
behaviour (BBPD). Since this pricing strategy is being used frequently, it has captured the attention of
1
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many scholars,1 whose main concern has been the understanding of its e↵ect on firms’ profits, consumer
surplus and level of prices.
The present paper participates in this debate investigating the e↵ects of BBPD when competing firms
are assumed to be located at the endpoints of a Hotelling line and to o↵er goods of di↵erent qualities. In
particular, in a two-period model, forward-looking firms can observe the purchase behaviour of consumers
and thus are allowed to discriminate between old and new buyers. Depending on the relative strength
of brands’ vertical di↵erentiation (di↵erence in the quality of the good o↵ered), the model exhibits two
di↵erent equilibria. For weak vertical di↵erentiation, unsurprisingly, the paper accords with the previous
literature of BBPD with symmetric competitors: firms set prices in such a way that both steal each
other’s consumers in the second period (Two-Direction Switching, TDS). The model is able to replicate
the results of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) if the di↵erence in quality is assumed to be zero and gives
the essential welfare result of symmetric BBPD: consumers are better o↵ and firms both worse o↵ when
price discrimination is feasible.
As soon as a certain level of vertical di↵erentiation is reached, the paper adds important findings to
the current literature. Specifically, firms converge to asymmetric pricing behaviours in the first period:
the strong seller adopts a margin-focusing strategy and the low-quality rival conquers most of the market.
As a consequence, buyers move in the second period only from the low-quality to the high-quality firm
(One-Direction Switching, ODS). On top of that, when di↵erentiation is very pronounced, ODS causes
the exit of the small firm, that would have been active under uniform pricing.
This inter-temporally unbalanced equilibrium follows from the fact that vertical di↵erentiation creates
an important asymmetry in the incentives that each firm has in the first period. In particular, the
stronger the vertical di↵erentiation, the more the high-quality firm best response is to use extreme
pricing strategies, i.e., either to be very aggressive focusing only on current market share (and becoming
monopolist in the first period) or to be benevolent focusing on margins and letting the rival conquer
most of the Hotelling line (but becoming monopolist in the second period). Clearly, the first strategy is
preferred when the rival sets a low price, since the fight becomes so hard to induce to lay down arms
today, aware of the fact that this brings to cheap ODS tomorrow (as switchers are relatively close). On
the other side, the low-quality firm anticipates that attracting consumers tomorrow will be more di cult
as di↵erentiation becomes stronger and it prefers to focus on conquering the largest possible market share
in the first period. This pushes it to be aggressive and to pursue a market-share focusing strategy.
With these mechanisms in mind, the implications on profits and consumer surplus of the asymmetric
equilibrium are straightforward. When consumers are myopic, BBPD becomes a very powerful tool for
the high-quality seller, which is given the possibility to decide the destiny of the rival. At equilibrium,
the high-quality firm decides to focus on margins and the low-quality firm enjoys a large market share. In
this scenario, firms reach endogenously a sort of market sharing agreement, which allocates the surplus
over time: the high-quality seller trades today’s for tomorrow’s market share and the low-quality firm
1 Starting from Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Esteves (2009) provides an extensive
and up-to-date survey on the existing literature in this field.
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does exactly the opposite. This turns out to be ex-post preferred by firms to the uniform pricing as
it reduces price competition in the first period. Concerning the low-quality firm, the positive e↵ect of
reduced first-period competition compensates the disadvantage provoked by its exit (or cornering) in the
second period. Consumers will be worse o↵ as they su↵er the reduced competition in terms of prices in
the first period and in term of number of competitors in the second period.
When consumers are instead forward-looking, they anticipate tomorrow switching and the first period
“elasticity of the demand” changes compared to the uniform pricing.2 This is a standard result of BBPD
literature: Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) discuss how the sensitivity to price of the market splitting location
is weaker when consumers are forward-looking in relation to uniform pricing. This boosts first-period
prices under BBPD. Oppositely, in the present model, when switching is uni-directional the elasticity to
price is increased by BBPD. This induces the low-quality firm to be more aggressive than in the case of
myopic consumers. As a consequence, the same force that lets the high-quality firm exert a strong power
when consumers are myopic, becomes a curse when consumers are forward-looking. Namely, if in the
first case di↵erentiation helps the high-quality firm to make high margins and lets the low-quality firm
enjoy a weakened competition, in the second one it imposes to the low-quality firm to be aggressive and
the high-quality firm su↵ers the increased competition in the first period. The result overall is that the
low-quality firm and the consumers are better o↵ under the discriminatory pricing at the expenses of the
high-quality firm.
Related Literature. The paper belongs naturally to the literature studying price discrimination in
oligopolies, which generally agrees on a negative impact on firms’ profits compared to uniform pricing.
This is because the typical positive e↵ect in the monopoly case (the so-called Surplus Extraction e↵ect) is
accompanied and often overturned by an intensification of competition in oligopolistic markets (Business
Stealing e↵ect). As a matter of fact, the information about brands preferences of consumers can be
used in two di↵erent ways when markets are duopolistic. On the one hand, each firm wants to charge
consumers belonging to its “strong” market (i.e., exhibiting relatively strong brand preference) with a
high price, thus exploiting information in order to extract their surplus. On the other hand, a given seller
also wants to set a low price in its “weak” market to steal rival’s business. In the jargon used by Corts
(1998), the market exhibits best-response asymmetry, as the“strong” market for a firm is “weak” for the
competitor. In these cases, the firms’ dominant strategy is to charge low prices in the rival’s “strong”
market and this, in turn, prevents the latter to fully extract surplus. In a very influential article, Thisse
and Vives (1988) show that if firms know the precise location of each consumer and can accordingly
engage in perfect price discrimination, then all prices might fall in relation to uniform pricing as the more
distant firm is very aggressive in each location. For given prices o↵ered by the rival, both firms find it
profitable to discriminate, but this leads to a reduction in prices in the style of a prisoner’s dilemma
situation.
2 Technically speaking, the demand in the model is inelastic. Nevertheless, using the expression elasticity helps capture
how market shares respond to marginal changes of prices in di↵erent ways moving from the uniform pricing to the case of
BBPD with forward-looking consumers.
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The paper is more specifically linked to the literature on BBPD, in which firms learn consumers’
preferences by observing their purchase behaviour in the past rather than have full information about
their locations. In Chen (1997),Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Esteves (2010),
the observation of consumers’ identities allows sellers to distinguish between “strong” market (previous
buyers) and “weak” market (rival’s inherited consumers), as purchase reveals how much a consumer is
inclined to buy one or the other product. The loss of firms and consequent gain of consumers are still
there: as the latter can be identified and price discrimination is permitted, both sellers have incentives
to steal each other’s consumers and prices fall down. More recent articles have demonstrated how results
may slightly or substantially di↵er under di↵erent settings. In a very recent paper, Colombo (2015) studies
the incentives to price discriminate shown by a firm facing a discriminating competitor. He demonstrates
that if consumers are myopic enough, the optimal choice is to commit to uniform prices even if the access
to information about purchases of consumers is completely costless. Furthermore, Esteves and Reggiani
(2014) show how increasing the demand elasticity reduces the negative impact of BBPD on firms’ profits,
while Chen and Pearcy (2010) demonstrate that when a weak correlation over time between preferences
of consumers is assumed, then BBPD will actually be beneficial for firms and detrimental for consumers.
The intuition behind the present paper is that the welfare e↵ect of BBPD depends crucially on the
symmetry of the market: if firms are identical ex-ante and compete fiercely for switchers, they end up
poaching the same number of consumers with the consequence of a lower level of prices and profits. In
the analysis of their two-period model, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) need specifically to
eliminate asymmetric subgames in order to provide their SPNE.3 Namely, they do not take into account
how an inherited market unbalanced in favour of one of the two firms may imply switching only from the
dominant to the dominated firm.4
Other articles dealing with price discrimination in asymmetric duopolies have results directly compara-
ble with the ones of this paper. As pointed out by Chen (2008), the e↵ects of dynamic price discrimination
change substantially from symmetric to asymmetric markets. In a considerably di↵erent approach from
the present paper with regard to time horizon and consumers’ preferences, he finds that price discrim-
ination can be a tool for a low-cost firm to eliminate the less e cient competitor and if exit happens
consumers are worse o↵ compared to uniform pricing. Sha↵er and Zhang (2002) propose a model where
vertically and horizontally di↵erentiated firms are allowed to (costly) target consumers with one-to-one
promotions (perfect price discrimination). They find that even though promotional o↵ers intensify price
competition they can result in a benefit in terms of market share and profits for the high-quality firm.
In Liu and Serfes (2005), firms can costly acquire information about consumers-specific characteristics.
They show that when information is not too costly, only the high-quality firm will buy it and engage in
price discrimination, with the low-quality firm opting for a uniform price strategy at equilibrium. Dif-
3From the article at page 639:“We will show that, provided that |✓⇤| is not too large, the second-period equilibrium
has this form: Both firms poach some of their rival’s first-period customers, so that some consumers do switch providers”.
In their model |✓⇤| represents the location of the time 1 indi↵erent agent in a Hotelling with firms symmetrically located
around zero.
4See Gehrig et al. (2007) for an analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) second period with the past taken as given.
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ferently from the last two articles, in the following model the information cannot be acquired and price
discrimination is only based on past purchase behaviour and, for strong vertical di↵erentiation, price
discrimination benefits the low-quality firm, as price competition is relaxed in the early stage. Gehrig
et al. (2011, 2012) propose models in which the asymmetry of the firms is given by some inherited market
dominance and firms are allowed to discriminate prices according to the (exogenous) purchase history of
consumers.5 Roughly speaking, their analysis is similar and allows for switching behaviours similar to
the subgames of the model presented hereafter, which endogenises the purchase history of consumers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the main ingredients of the
model. After, sections 1.3 and 1.4 are devoted to the analysis of the two benchmarks of uniform and
discriminatory pricing. The two regimes are then compared in order to provide a welfare analysis on the
e↵ects of BBPD in Section 1.5. Finally, Section 1.6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.2 Description of the model
Two competing firms i = H,L aim at selling a good to a population of customers assumed to be uniformly
distributed along a unit segment. Firms locations are kept fixed at the end-points of this segment: firm
H is located at lH = 0 and L at lL = 1. Sellers are vertically di↵erentiated, as the qualities of the
products they sell are di↵erent. For the sake of simplicity, firm H is assumed to sell the high-quality
good. Formally, it is assumed that qH   qL, where qk denotes the quality of the product o↵ered by firm
k 2 {H,L}.
Consumers face a transportation cost normalised to 1 per unit of distance covered to reach the location
of each firm and valuate linearly the quality of the good they buy. According to these assumptions, the
per-period utility of an agent located at x who buys good i will be given by:
U(x, i) = qi   pi   |x  li|. (1.1)
Firms set prices in order to maximise profits, facing a unitary cost normalised to 0 in each time period
and discounting the future at a factor   < 1. Each time period is composed of two stages. In stage (1.1)
firms simultaneously set prices pH1 and p
L
1 and in stage (1.2) consumers decide upon purchase. In stage
(2.1), firms simultaneously set prices knowing who bought which good in period 1: piH2 is defined as the
price set by firm i for a consumer who bought good H in period 1, while piL2 is charged to L’s inherited
clients. In the last stage (2.2) consumers observe the new prices and buy again.
The following sections provide a complete analysis of the model. In particular, the next section
introduces a benchmark case in which customer’s recognition is not allowed, useful to isolate the e↵ects
of BBPD. The subsequent section describes the possible equilibria when firms are allowed to engage in
BBPD.
5 In particular, Gehrig et al. (2011) provides the limit case of an entry model.
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1.3 Uniform Pricing
Assume there exists a ban on price discrimination or that customers’ purchases cannot be observed. In
this scenario, the utility of an agent buying respectively good H and good L will be:
U(x,H) = qH   pH   x, U(x, L) = qL   pL   (1  x).
Accordingly, the indi↵erent consumer is located at:
x¯ =
1
2
+
 + pL   pH
2
, (1.2)
where   ⌘ qH   qL. We assume hereafter that qH and qL are high enough so that consumers of all
locations prefer to buy one of the two products (full market coverage) and that the prices chosen by the
two firms are not too di↵erent in order to get rid of situations in which one firm corners the market.
Accordingly, the cuto↵ x¯ determines a demand of x¯ for firm H and 1   x¯ for firm L. Moreover, the
attention is restricted only to cases in which the di↵erence in quality is not too large to eject the low-
quality firm out of the market. As can be clearly seen below, the necessary and su cient condition for
this to be the case is   < 3, which allows firm L to charge an above-marginal-cost price at equilibrium.
This assumption is maintained hereafter.
Anticipating the reaction of consumers, firms set prices in order to maximise the following static
profits:
⇡H = pH
✓
1
2
+
 + pL   pH
2
◆
, ⇡L = pL
✓
1
2
   + p
L   pH
2
◆
.
It is worth noticing that, in comparison with the standard Hotelling with equal qualities, firm H can
charge higher prices as   > 0 and the opposite happens to the low quality firm. Indeed, the equilibrium
prices are the following:
pHu = 1 +
 
3
, pLu = 1 
 
3
.
They take into account both horizontal (through the transportation cost, 1) and vertical (through the
term /3) di↵erentiation. Specifically, 1 represents the market power that both firms enjoy on consumers,
whereas  /3 is the result of the competitive advantage that firm H enjoys because sells a higher quality
product. The prices above result in the following static equilibrium profits:
⇡Hu =
(3 + )2
18
, ⇡Lu =
(3  )2
18
.
Under uniform price in both periods, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium gives a replication of the
static equilibrium, with the following overall profits:
⇡Hu =
(1 +  )
18
(3 + )2, ⇡Lu =
(1 +  )
18
(3  )2. (1.3)
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1.4 Observation of Purchases and BBPD
In this section, first-period prices as well as the behaviour of first-period consumers are assumed to be
observable to both firms when they choose second-period discriminatory prices. Subgame perfection is
used as equilibrium concept.
1.4.1 Second-Period Subgames
In stage (2.2) consumers observe prices for loyalists and for switchers o↵ered by both firms. In the
inherited turf of firm H, a consumer prefers to buy again good H rather than switch seller when qH  
pHH2   x > qL   pLH2   (1  x), which gives the following indi↵erent location:
xˆH2 =
1
2
+
 + pLH2   pHH2
2
, (1.4)
so that xˆH agents buy again good H. Defining xˆ1 as the inherited market share of firm H,6 xˆ1  xˆH2 agents
will instead switch towards firm L. Concerning the turf of firm L, consumers compare qH   pHL2  x with
qL   pLL2   (1  x). It means that all agents located on the right of
xˆL2 =
1
2
+
 + pLL2   pHL2
2
(1.5)
will buy again good L, whereas agents located in the interval
⇥
xˆ1, xˆL2
⇤
will switch to firm H.
Firms anticipate this reaction of consumers and set prices in stage (2.1). The analysis at this stage
depends on the market shares (xˆ1, 1   xˆ1) inherited from the first period, which determine the actual
chances to have switching from one firm to the other one and the other way around. Di↵erently from
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), who assume the inherited markets to be symmetric enough, here all possible
subgames are analyzed in the backward-induction analysis of the model. In particular, we have subgames
with two-direction switching (TDS) and subgames with switching only towards one of the two firms
(one-direction switching or ODS).
When firms expect switching to occur in both directions, the thresholds described by equations (1.4)
and (1.5) are located in such a way that prices can be found in both turfs such that xˆH2 < xˆ1 < xˆ
L
2 . When
instead firms expect switching to occur only towards the high-quality firm (H), the thresholds above are
located in such a way that xˆ1  xˆH2 and xˆ1 < xˆL2 . These two examples are depicted in the figure below.
0 xˆH2 xˆ1 xˆ
L
2
1
loyal to Hz }| {
| {z }
switchers to L
switchers to Hz }| {
| {z }
loyal to L
0 xˆ1 xˆL2 1
loyal to Hz}|{ switchers to Hz }| {
| {z }
loyal to L
Figure 1.1: Di↵erent Switching Scenarios
Considering the possible subgames, the following proposition contains all possible scenarios when the
inherited base of customers xˆ1 is considered exogenous.
6Notice that under the assumption of fully covered market, 1   xˆ1 is the first period market share of firm L.
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Proposition 1. When firms are allowed to price discriminate between old and rival’s previous consumers,
the second-period equilibrium prices are:
(i)
pHH2 = 1 +   2xˆ1, pLH2 = 0,
pHL2 = 1 +
 
3   43 xˆ1, pLL2 = 1   +23 + 23 (1  xˆ1)
)
when xˆ1  1+ 4
(ii)
pHH2 = 1 +
 
3 +
2
3 xˆ1, p
LH
2 = 1   3   43 (1  xˆ1),
pHL2 = 1 +
 
3   43 xˆ1, pLL2 = 1   +23 + 23 (1  xˆ1)
)
when xˆ1 2
 
1+ 
4 ,
3+ 
4
 
(iii)
pHH2 = 1 +
 
3 +
2xˆ1
3 , p
LH
2 = 1   3   43 (1  xˆ1),
pHL2 = 0, p
LL
2 = 1    2(1  xˆ1)
)
when xˆ1   3+ 4
Proof. See mathematical appendix.
In order to better grasp the intuition behind Proposition 1 let us consider the equilibrium prices in
point (ii). Unsurprisingly, a stronger vertical di↵erentiation is associated with a competitive advantage in
favour of the high-quality firm, whose equilibrium prices for old and new consumers are both increasing
in  . Exactly the opposite relation exists between the prices of the low-quality firm and the vertical
di↵erentiation parameter.
Moreover, the own inherited market share7 a↵ects positively the price a given firm charges to the old
loyal consumers and negatively the one o↵ered to the switchers. Intuitively, the relation between prices
and market share follows directly from the e↵ective power that the size of the first-period market creates
in each turf for the “attacking” (else turf) and the “defending” firm (own turf). Clearly, the attack in
the rival turf turns out to be more costly as the size of the market already conquered in the first period
becomes higher. In other words, the price o↵ered to the switchers should be lower when a lot of consumers
were attracted in the first period, since the non-conquered portion is very far away in the Hotelling line.
For extreme levels of the market share,8 attracting new consumers is not profitable as it would require
a below-marginal-cost price. These cases are presented in points (i) and (iii), where respectively firm H
and L prefer the dominating strategy of setting prices equal to the marginal cost (i.e., 0) in the rival turf.
From the point of view of the defending firm, the higher the market share inherited from the past the
weaker the price competition in its own turf, as the rival becomes less aggressive. For this reason, the
equilibrium price for loyalists9 is increasing in the inherited market share. In the extreme cases in which
the attacking rival sets the price equal to the marginal cost (points (i) and (iii) in the proposition), then
the optimal response of the defending firm is to o↵er to past consumers a price just su cient not to lose
any of them.
These equilibrium prices will determine peculiar switching behaviours of consumers. If the first-period
market is balanced enough, then both firms succeed in finding profitable prices to o↵er to rival’s consumers
and both are able to attract (and respectively su↵er the loss of) some new (old) consumers. If instead
the market is strongly dominated by a firm in the first period, the dominating firm does not attract any
rival consumers, even though it charges a price equal to the marginal cost. For this reason, switching
will be one-direction towards the dominated firm. These results are formally presented in the following
corollary:
7The market shares will be xˆ1 for the high-quality firm and the remaining 1   xˆ1 for the low-quality rival given the
assumption of full market coverage.
8According to the proposition, this level will be 3+ 4 for firm H and 1  1+ 4 for firm L.
9See prices pHH2 and p
LL
2 in point (ii) of proposition 1.
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Corollary 1. Given the equilibrium prices in Proposition 1: (i) when xˆ1   +14 , consumers only switch
to firm H (ODS); (ii) when xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
, consumers switch from H to L and vice-versa (TDS); and
(iii) when xˆ1   max{ +34 , 1}, consumers only switch to firm L (ODS).
Proof. Plugging the equilibrium prices in proposition 1, it is easy to find the following cuto↵s: (i) when
xˆ1   +14 , xˆH2 = xˆ1 and xˆL2 =  +2xˆ1+36 ; (ii) when xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
, xˆH2 =
 +2xˆ1+1
6 and xˆ
L
2 =
 +2xˆ1+3
6 ;
(iii) when xˆ1   max{ +34 , 1}, xˆH2 =  +2xˆ1+16 and xˆL2 = 1  xˆ1.
1.4.2 First Period
In stage (1.2) consumers observe prices and buy the good giving them the highest utility. In what
follows, consumers are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they only care about the utility they get at stage (1.2),
without anticipating the second-period (possible) switching.10 The main features of the forward-looking
consumers case are discussed in a separate paragraph and formally in the appendix.
Under myopia, the first-period indi↵erent consumer will be located at:
xˆ1 =
1
2
+
 + pL1   pH1
2
, (1.6)
so that all agents to the left of the cuto↵ above buy the high-quality good and all agents to the right buy
the low-quality good. Following a backward induction reasoning, in the initial stage (1.1) forward-looking
firms correctly anticipate both purchase decisions in stage (1.2) and all possible subgames. Anticipating
first-period purchase behaviour of consumers expressed by the cuto↵ in (1.6) and discounting future
profits, firm H and L respectively maximize the following inter-temporal profits:
⇡H1 +  ⇡
H
2 = p
H
1 xˆ1 +  
⇥
pHH2 min
 
xˆH2 , xˆ1
 
+ pHL2 max
 
xˆL2   xˆ1, 0
 ⇤
,
⇡L1 +  ⇡
L
2 = p
L
1 (1  xˆ1) +  
⇥
pLL2 min
 
1  xˆL2 , 1  xˆ1
 
+ pLH2 max
 
xˆ1   xˆH2 , 0
 ⇤
.
Clearly, the future profits depend on the expectations firms have about tomorrow’s movements of
consumers. In particular, plugging the prices in proposition 1 and the resulting cuto↵s expressed in the
proof of Corollary 1, second-period profits depend on the inherited market share as follows:
⇡H2 (xˆ1) =
8><>:
⇡H2H =
 2+(9 2xˆ1(10xˆ1+3))+2 (5xˆ1+3)
18 if firms expect xˆ1   +14 ,
⇡H2TDS =
 2+5(2xˆ21 2xˆ1+1) 2 (xˆ1 2)
9 if xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
,
⇡H2L =
( +2xˆ1+1)
2
18 if xˆ1   max{ +34 , 1}.
for firm H. Similarly, firm L anticipates profits:
⇡L2 (xˆ1) =
8>><>>:
⇡L2H =
( +(2xˆ1 3))2
18 if firms expect xˆ1   +14 ,
⇡L2TDS =
 2+5(2xˆ21 2xˆ1+1) 2 (xˆ1+1)
9 if xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
,
⇡L2L =
 2+(46xˆ1 20xˆ21 17)+2 (5xˆ1 8)
18 if xˆ1   max{ +34 , 1}.
10As discussed in the book of Belleflamme and Peitz (2010), the e↵ect of consumers’ farsightedness is essentially that
BBPD weakens price competition in the first period compared to uniform pricing because of a lower first-period elasticity
to price. In the context of the present paper, which analyses all possible scenarios and not only the symmetric one, one
can observe how the farsightedness of consumers would bring to richer results because the responsiveness to price of the
infra-marginal consumer is very strong in the asymmetric cases.
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where the notation H,L, and TDS in the subscripts are used to indicate that switching is respectively
towards firm H only, towards firm L only or towards both directions. The following paragraph is devoted
to the description of best responses, that exhibit peculiar features as firms can choose very di↵erent pricing
strategies according to the inter-temporal objective they want to pursue. Subsequently, the equilibria of
the model are presented, giving also some insights on the main characteristics of prices and switching
behaviour. Finally, the last paragraph of this section discusses the case of forward-looking consumers,
highlighting the main di↵erence with the case of myopia.
Best Responses and Vertical Di↵erentiation. In order to build up the best responses of firms, the
following approach is used. For given price of the rival pj1, firm i has three di↵erent alternatives. Namely,
it can optimally choose a price pi1H(p
j
1), p
i
1TDS(p
j
1) or p
i
1L(p
j
1) leading respectively to the market splitting
cuto↵ xˆ1 in the interval [0,
1+ 
4 ] or (
1+ 
4 ,
3+ 
4 ) or [
3+ 
4 , 1] and giving firm i the correspondent second-
period profits. The resulting profits in each of the three cases are then compared: the best response will
be the one leading to the highest profit.
Albeit the complete construction of the best responses is left to the appendix, it is worth discussing
their main features. The best-reply price will inter-temporally trade-o↵ between today’s profits (market
share and per-consumer margin) and tomorrow’s cost of poaching consumers. In particular, choosing
an aggressive pricing strategy focusing on today’s market share will entail a relative low per-consumer
margin and makes the attraction of new consumers very costly. When a firm is particularly aggressive
today, it conquers a large market and tomorrow only the rival succeeds in attracting new consumers. The
best response price in this case will be respectively
pH1L =
(9  2 )
18  2  p
L
1 +
9  4 
18  2  +
(9  4 ) 
18  2 
and
pL1H =
(9  2 )
18  2  p
H
1 +
9  4 
18  2   
(9  4 ) 
18  2  .
In principle, when a firm is very aggressive this strategy can also lead to the corner case in which it
becomes monopolist, i.e., pH1M = p
L
1 +     1 or pL1M = pH1       1.11 On the other hand, choosing a
benevolent pricing strategy that focuses on high margins on few consumers in the first period will make
the attack of the rival turf less costly in the second period. The best response price in this case will be
respectively
pH1H =
(10  + 9)
18 + 10 
pL1 +
9 + 13 
18 + 10 
+
 
2
and
pL1L =
(10  + 9)
18 + 10 
pH1 +
9 + 13 
18 + 10 
   
2
.
Choosing a more inter-temporally balanced strategy will instead lead to tomorrow’s TDS. In this case,
the best response prices will be:
pH1TDS =
(9  10 )
18  10  p
L
1 +
9
18  10  +
(9  8 ) 
18  10 
11As it will be shown afterwards, these prices are never part of an equilibrium but they happen to be best responses for
high levels of the rival’s price.
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and
pL1TDS =
(9  10 )
18  10  p
H
1 +
9
18  10   
(9  8 ) 
18  10  .
The global best response is found by choosing the alternative leading to the highest profit among the
three strategies described above. It turns out that the optimal pricing behaviours change dramatically
according to the strength of the asymmetry present in the market.
In particular, when vertical di↵erentiation is weaker than horizontal di↵erentiation (  < 1), the best
responses have the following forms:
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 (pˆ, pˆLC) ,
pH1L if p
L
1   pˆLC ,
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
8><>:
pL1L if p
H
1  p˜,
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 [p˜, p˜HC ] ,
pL1H if p
H
1   p˜HC ,
where
pˆ ⌘
p
(9 +9)2 (5  +5 )2
30 +
65  15  
90   3 +310 , p˜LC ⌘ 18 3   5 9 ,
p˜ ⌘
p
(9 9 )2 (5  5  )2
30 +
65 +15  
90 +
3  3
10 and p˜HC ⌘ 18+3   5 9
are the cuto↵ values of rival’s prices that induce each firm to switch from one strategy (aggressive,
balanced, benevolent) to another one.
pH1 (p
L
1 )
pL1
pH1
pL1 (p
H
1 )
pH1H pH1TDS
pH1L
pL1L
pL1TDS
pL1H
Figure 1.2: Best Responses:   < 1
Intuitively, being aggressive (respectively benevolent) today is preferred when the rival is benevolent
(aggressive). Indeed, if the rival sets a high price, being aggressive today does not entail a substantial
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cost in terms of lower margins. Therefore, since a firm is given the possibility to make high margins on
a large market today, it does not care at all about tomorrow switching. Oppositely, when the rival is
very aggressive, a seller will let him conquer a large part of the market, enjoying uni-directional switching
tomorrow. In other words, the seller lays down arms today when the fight becomes too hard, aware of
the fact that this will bring to a cheap conquest of rival territory tomorrow.
Finally, firm i will prefer pi1TDS when the rival chooses an intermediate price. In this segment, the
best response is less steep than in the two extreme cases since it involves an inter-temporal balance
of incentives. Namely, once a firm prefers to play a ODS equilibrium (either to itself or to the rival),
then second period turns out to be less important because the change determined by a price cut (or
increase) today does not involve sizeable changes in the movements of consumers tomorrow. Thus, the
best response will be more sensitive too any price change of the rival compared to the TDS case, in which
future movements of consumers are more crucial.12
As vertical di↵erentiation is stronger than horizontal di↵erentiation, ODS to firm L is no more a threat
for the high-quality firm, as it is reachable only if the latter becomes a monopolist in the first period.13 In
particular, as the price charged by the low-quality firm reaches a cuto↵ (i.e., pL1 > pˆM ⌘ 27+2   10  9 9 ),
pH1TDS is not optimal any more and firm L cannot enter the market in the first period. Moreover, the cuto↵
price pˆM is decreasing in the level of vertical di↵erentiation, meaning that the stronger the asymmetry
the narrower the segment in which the high-quality firm finds it optimal the inter-temporally balanced
strategy leading to TDS. This will determine the following firm H best response for increasing levels of
asymmetry:
if   2 [1, 3  12 9 2  ], pH1 (pL1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 (pˆ, pˆM ) ,
pH1M if p
L
1   pˆM ,
if   2 [3  12 9 2  ,  ˆ], pH1 (pL1 ) =
8>>><>>>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 (pˆ, pˆM ) ,
pH1H if p
L
1 2 [pˆM , pˆH ] ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆH ,
if      ˆ, pH1 (pL1 ) =
(
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆH ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆH .
where  ˆ ⌘ 3  12(
p
81 25 2 (9 2 ))
36 29  .
14
On the other hand, firm L entry is prevented in the first-period if rival’s price is lower than a certain
level (i.e., pH1 < p˜M ⌘ 10  9+(9 2 ) 9 ). Again, since p˜ increases in  , increasing vertical di↵erentiation
12Notice that the higher the discount factor, the less sensitive the best response today. When the discount factor is very
high (i.e.,   > 9/10), this tendency brings to situations in which prices are strategic substitutes. This is because, when the
future is very important, firms see a price cut of the rival as an opportunity of conquering a large market tomorrow rather
than a threat of losing market share today. Accordingly, a price cut of the rival induces a firm to slightly increase the price
today making high per-consumer margins, mainly focusing on the attraction of consumers tomorrow.
13 Indeed, according to Corollary 6 ODS to L can be the case only if xˆ1   max{ +34 , 1}.
14It is easy to verify that
p
81  25 2   (9  2 ) > 0 for all   2 [0, 1], meaning that  ˆ < 3.
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pL1
pH1H
pH1Mp
L
1H
p˜M
prevented entry
pˆM
pH1 (p
L
1 )p
L
1 (p
H
1 )pH1
  2 [3   12 
9 2  ,  ˆ]
pL1
pH1
  >  ˆ
p˜M
prevented entry
pH1 (p
L
1 )p
L
1 (p
H
1 )
pH1H
pH1Mp
L
1H
Figure 1.3: Best Responses when   > 1
entails that the segment in which TDS is possible is narrower. Formally the best response of firm L when
  > 1 will be:
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
(
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 [p˜M , p˜HC),
pL1H if p
H
1   p˜HC .
Figure 1.3 gives a graphical representation of the best responses when firms are more vertically than
horizontally di↵erentiated. Two di↵erent cases are depicted.15 The left figure describes situations in which
vertical di↵erentiation is not so strong to eliminate completely the TDS price from the best response of
the high-quality firm. In particular, TDS is optimally chosen in second tiny segment. For a rival price
higher than pˆM , the high-quality firm is given the possibility to choose between charging a high price
today enjoying ODS tomorrow and conquering the entire market today. Clearly, the first solution is
preferred for relatively low prices charged by the rival as being aggressive would entail a too high loss
in terms of per-consumer margins. Oppositely, when the rival is benevolent and sets a high price, the
conquest of the entire Hotelling line in the first period turns out to be preferred. The right figure follows
exactly the same reasoning, with the only di↵erence that TDS is never chosen by the high quality firm.
Graphically, the second segment in the left figure disappears completely and for low levels of firm L prices,
only pH1H is chosen. On the other side, the entry of L can be prevented by charging a su ciently low price
(< p˜M ).
Finally, it is worth noticing a sudden discontinuity in the best response when switching to the ODS
scenario.16 This ”jump” is due to a sharp change of strategy when we consider a rival’s undercut. Assume
a price of the rival just above the maximal level inducing a firm to use a benevolent pricing strategy.
If the rival slightly lowers the price, the high-margins focused strategy becomes suddenly preferred to
the alternative in which the market shares are inter-temporally balanced (or to the market-share focused
solution). The discontinuity in the best response indicates that the focus on margins is particularly
15 The case in which   2 [1, 3  12 9 2  ] is not represented in the figures as it is similar to the one with   < 1. The only
di↵erence is that ODS to L can be the case only if the low-quality firm does not enter the market in the first period.
16 In figure 1.2, this jump is present in the passage from the first (leading to ODS) to the second segment (leading to
TDS) of the best responses of both firms. In figure 1.3, this jump is not present in the best response of the low-quality firm
as ODS disappears. For the high-quality firm, we have three jumps, the first two when we pass from pH1H to p
H
1TDS and
vice-versa and the second passing from pH1H to p
H
1L.
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intense, as the responding firm will suddenly increase the price.17
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria. In the analysis of equilibria, one should take into account
two main aspects. On the one hand, it is important to see under which conditions asymmetric equilibria
(ODS) can be reached at equilibrium. This is an important novelty of the paper compared to the
symmetric approach leading always to TDS proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), which result can
be found in the present paper just setting vertical di↵erentiation parameter   = 0. On the other hand,
due to the discontinuities in the best-response functions, equilibria might fail to exist or can be multiple.
The following proposition summarise all possible scenarios:
Proposition 2. (Equilibria)
1. (TDS) If   < 3  8 9 4  ⌘  ¯, there exists an equilibrium in which the prices are:
(pH⇤1TDS , p
L⇤
1TDS) =
⇣
1 +  3   4  81 60  , 1   3 + 4  81 60 
⌘
resulting in TDS in the second period.
2. (ODS) If   > 3 min
n
8 
9 6  ,
28 (2 +9)
 (14 +27)+162
o
⌘  , there exists an equilibrium in which prices are:
(pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) =
⇣
1 +  3 +
2 (22+11(1  )+ (1+5 )
24 +81 , 1   3 +  (15(1  )+11 +(10  7) )24 +81
⌘
resulting in ODS to firm H in the second period.
3. (Existence and Multiplicity) If the discount factor is not too high (i.e.,   < 0.93875), then the two
equilibria coexist in the interval [ ,  ¯]. Otherwise, no equilibrium exists in the interval [ ¯, ].
Proof. See Appendix for a complete proof.
We can observe two di↵erent sorts of equilibria. In the first one, both firms choose an inter-temporally
balanced pricing strategy that leads to TDS (point 1.). When quality di↵erentiation is rather substan-
tial, asymmetric behaviours arise. Specifically, the high-quality firm finds it profitable to implement a
benevolent pricing strategy, which allows for the obtainment of high first-period margins associated with
second-period ODS. The following corollary of Proposition 2 formally explains how market is shared
di↵erently in the two equilibria and how this a↵ects the second-period switching of consumers.
Corollary 2. (Market Shares & Switching)
1. When (pH⇤1TDS , p
L⇤
1TDS) are the equilibrium prices, then xˆ1 =
1
2 +
(9 4 ) 
54 40  , xˆ
H
2 =
1
3 +
2(3 2 ) 
27 20  and
xˆL2 =
2
3 +
2(3 2 ) 
27 20  . In the second period xˆ1  xˆH2 = 16   (3 4 ) 54 40  consumers switch from H to L and
xˆL2   xˆ1 = 16 + (3 4 ) 54 40  move to the opposite direction.
2. When (pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) are the equilibrium prices, then xˆ1 = xˆ
H
2 =
1
2   (7 +9)  17 16 +54 , and xˆL2 = 12 +
5   3 +12 +9
16 +54 . In the second period, min
 
xˆL2   xˆ1, 1  xˆ1
 
consumers switch from L to H.
17As it will be clarified when discussing the forward-looking case, these jumps are made possible and preferred by the fact
that myopic consumers are not a↵ected by tomorrow switching, and thus their responsiveness to price in the first period
does not change passing from TDS to ODS scenarios.
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Proof. The results are found by plugging the firs-period equilibrium prices into the cuto↵s expressed in
equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6).
The corollary above highlights two di↵erent scenarios. In the first one firms share first-period market
in a relatively balanced way and both succeed in stealing rival consumers in the second period. In the
second one, reached when vertical di↵erentiation is important enough, we observe a sort of market sharing
agreement, according to which firms allocate market shares and surplus over time in an asymmetric way.
In particular, firm H pursues a benevolent pricing strategy, consisting in being ino↵ensive today in order
to induce a favourable response of the low-quality rival. This strategy lets firm H make high unitary
margins on a small number of consumers, allowing for the opportunity of a large market to conquer
cheaply in the second period.
Unsurprisingly, this benevolent pricing strategy will lead to a mitigated price competition for increas-
ing   compared to the uniform pricing case. This result is formally stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. For what concerns equilibrium prices, the following holds:
(a) high-quality firm: @p
H⇤
1H
@  >
@pH⇤1TDS
@  > 0 and p
H⇤
1H > p
H
u ;
(b) low-quality firm: @p
L⇤
1TDS
@  <
@pL⇤1H
@  < 0 and p
L⇤
1H > p
L
u ;
(c) BBPD and symmetry of prices:
pH⇤1TDS   pL⇤1TDS < pHu   pLu and pH⇤1H   pL⇤1H > pHu   pLu .
Corollary 3 highlights three main aspects. First, BBPD makes first-period prices more (respectively
less) symmetric in relation to the uniform pricing when the symmetric (asymmetric) equilibrium emerges.
Second, the equilibrium price set by the high-quality firm (respectively by the low-quality firm) is a↵ected
positively (negatively) by the di↵erence in quality. This simply follows from the fact that an increase
in the vertical di↵erentiation gives the high-quality a stronger power. The di↵erence between the two
scenarios is that the positive e↵ect on strong firm’s price is amplified and the negative e↵ect on weak
firm’s price is mitigated passing from the symmetric to the asymmetric equilibrium. This together with
the fact that ODS-to-H equilibrium is associated with higher levels of vertical di↵erentiation suggests
that price competition is less severe when the asymmetric equilibrium arises.
Finally, the ODS equilibrium entails an attenuation of competition in relation with the uniform pricing
in two di↵erent ways. On the one hand, Corollary 3 shows that first-period prices are higher than the
uniform price. This is the case because of the benevolent pricing strategy implemented by the high-quality
firm. On the other hand, ODS to H in general entails the exit of the low quality firm which cannot find
any profitable way to compete in the second period. This result is formally explained in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4. (Exit of the low quality firm) If   > max{ 11 +185 +12 , }, then ODS to H determines the exit
of the low quality firm from the market.
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Proof. Take the xˆL2 =
1
2 +
5   3 +12 +9
16 +54 resulting from (p
H⇤
1H , p
L⇤
1H). It holds that:
1
2 +
5   3 +12 +9
16 +54 > 1 ,   > 11 +185 +12 . Since ODS-to-H equilibrium exists only if   >  , the result
of the corollary is proved.
ODS to H + Exit
TDS
TDS + ODS
ODS to H no Exit
No equilibrium
Figure 1.4: Equilibria with myopic consumers.
The result in the corollary above is due by the fact that the high-quality firm conquers a small market
in the first period, with the consequence that competing in the rival’s territory in the second period
becomes very easy. This gives the high-quality firm a way to profitably attack all the rival turf and to
conquer the entire Hotelling segment. For the sake of completeness, when the discount factor is very high
(  > 6/7), there exist situations in which the low-quality firm survives, albeit it is relegated to a very
tiny corner of the market. As can be seen in Figure 1.4, these instances can arise only for very specific
combinations of vertical di↵erentiation and discount factor.
Forward-Looking Consumers: Best Responses and Equilibria. This paragraph is devoted to a
brief description of best responses and equilibria under consumers’ farsightedness, providing a discussion
about the main di↵erences between myopic and forward-looking consumers. For all technical details, the
reader is invited to read the appendix.
In the present setting, a forward-looking consumer should be able to correctly anticipate tomorrow’s
switching scenarios (TDS or ODS). In order to find the indi↵erent first-period consumer, the following
approach is used. When consumers observe prices pH1 , p
L
1 o↵ered by firms, they become aware about
which game firms are playing in terms of tomorrow’s switching (TDS or ODS). Accordingly, the indi↵erent
period-one consumer will locate di↵erently according to her expectations. Let us assume that TDS is
expected. The rational consumer indi↵erent in period one foresees that if she buys good H in time 1,
she will switch to L in the next period and vice-versa. As proved in the appendix, this consumer will be
located at:
xˆFL1TDS =
1
2
+
(3   ) + 3(pL1   pH1 )
2  + 6
. (1.7)
When ODS to H is expected, the rational consumer foresees that if she buys good H in time 1, she
will buy it again in the second period, whereas if she purchases product L, she will switch to H in the
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subsequent period. As proved in the appendix, this consumer will be located at:
xˆFL1H =
1
2
+
(3  2 ) + 3(pL1   pH1 ) +  
6  2  . (1.8)
The main di↵erence between expecting symmetric and asymmetric switching is that the indi↵erent
consumer is more sensitive to price in the second case. On top of that, as expressed in the following
lemma, the “elasticity” of first period demand in relation to uniform pricing is respectively reduced when
TDS occurs and increased when ODS occurs.
Lemma 1. If consumers foresee the future switching scenarios, the location of the indi↵erent consumer
is more sensible to price changes when tomorrow’s switching is expected to be uni-directional, i.e.,
|@xˆ
FL
1H
@pi1
| = 3
6  2  > |
@xˆ1
@pi1
| = 1
2
= | @x¯
@pi1
| > 3
6 + 2 
= |@xˆ
FL
1TDS
@pi1
|
with i 2 {H,L}.
Compared to the non-discriminatory regime, the “elasticity” changes because forward-looking con-
sumers take into account not only the direct impact of a price variation,18 but also the indirect e↵ect
of a variation over the second period’s prices. Colombo (2015) provides a very accurate and precise
explanation of this e↵ect in the symmetric case and points out how the demand “elasticity” is lower
under BBPD.19 Oppositely, when ODS is assumed to be the case, consumers anticipate that tomorrow’s
discounted prices will be less attractive as firm H will not need to lower the price too much to attract
switchers. As a result, the first-period benefit from switching after a price decrease is higher than in the
uniform case. This result is very important to understand the discontinuity in the best responses that we
can observe in Figure 1.5. Di↵erently from the case of myopic consumers, discontinuities emerge when
the price of the rival is high rather than when it is low. In particular, when the price of the rival reaches
a threshold, we have the passage from TDS to an aggressive best-response leading to uni-directional
switching towards the rival. When this change happens, a forward-looking consumer anticipates it. And,
since the responsiveness to price of the indi↵erent consumer becomes suddenly stronger, a firm should
suddenly lower the price in order to attract a lot of consumers. For this reason, we observe jumps down-
wards when rival’s price reaches a certain level. This also entails that the best response of the high-quality
firm becomes continuous when the vertical di↵erentiation is stronger than horizontal di↵erentiation and
ODS to L is not a threat (last two plots of Figure 1.5).20
Concerning the shape of the best response prices and their relation with the strength of vertical
di↵erentiation, the essential ingredients are still there. In particular, Figure 1.5 shows how firms trade-o↵
between first-period market share and second-period switching by being essentially aggressive in pricing
18 Notice that they would consider only this direct e↵ect both in the uniform pricing regime and in the myopic-consumers
case.
19Studying an increase in the price of firm L, he concludes the following: “It follows that the first-period benefit from
shifting from firm L to firm H is lower when future is taken into account. Hence, the higher   is, the lower is the benefit
from shifting after a first-period price decrease’.’
20 As a matter of fact, the continuity of firm H optimal price together with the fact that both best responses are always
upward sloping is what technically determines the non-emergence of multiple equilibria, as it can never happen that the
two functions cross each other more than once.
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  < 1.   2 (1, FL)
  >  FL
Figure 1.5: Best Responses for Increasing  :
Forward-Looking Consumers.
when the rival is benevolent and benevolent when the rival is aggressive. An inter-temporally balanced
TDS is instead chosen when the rival price is intermediate and, similarly to the case of myopic consumers,
the best response is less steep in the latter intermediate case than in the former extreme ones.21 The
equilibria are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (Equilibria with Forward-Looking Consumers)
1. If   < 3  20 9+3  ⌘  ¯FL, there exists a unique equilibrium in which prices are:
(pH⇤1TDS , p
L⇤
1TDS) =
⇣
1 +  3 +
 
3   (13 9 )  81 33  , 1   3 +  3 + (13 9 )  81 33 
⌘
,
resulting in TDS in the second period.
2. If   > 3  min
⇢
20 
9+3  ,
20 
⇣
9
⇣
3
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+227
⌘
  
⇣
4 +
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+1029
⌘⌘
3(1296  (279  ( +138)))
 
⌘  FL, there exists
a unique equilibrium in which prices are:
(pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) =
⇣
1 +  3   4 (9 +(5  )  12)3(27  ) , 1   3 +  (( +29)  21( +1))3(27  )
⌘
,
resulting in ODS to firm H in the second period.
3. For   > 0.6871, no equilibrium exists in the interval [ ¯FL, FL].
Similarly to the case of myopic consumers, when vertical di↵erentiation is substantial, the asymmetric
equilibrium arises. Nevertheless, some important di↵erences emerge. First, the region in which equilibria
21Here though TDS prices are always strategic complements. This is due to the fact that consumers correctly anticipate
tomorrow’s switching and therefore any price cut today would bring to less substantial movements of consumers in the
second-period compared to the myopic-consumer case.
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are multiple disappears. Second, since the elasticity of the demand today is stronger in the asymmetric
equilibrium, firm L is much more aggressive when consumers are forward-looking than when they are
myopic. This makes the benevolent pricing strategy implemented by the high-quality firm less e↵ective
in terms of reduction of price competition. In other words, vertical di↵erentiation in association with
BBPD pushes the low-quality firm to be more aggressive today and to let the rival enjoy ODS tomorrow.
All these results are formally are expressed in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. For what concerns equilibrium prices, the following holds:
(a) high-quality firm: @p
H⇤
1TDS
@  >
@pH⇤1H
@  > 0 and p
H⇤
1H < p
H
u ;
(b) low-quality firm: @p
L⇤
1TDS
@  <
@pL⇤1H
@  < 0 and p
L⇤
1H > p
L
u ;
(c) BBPD ”symmetrizes” the prices:
pH⇤1TDS   pHu < pL⇤1TDS   pLu and pH⇤1H   pHu < pL⇤1H   pLu .
In commenting Corollary 5, we only focus on the di↵erences in relation to the counterpart corollary
with myopic consumers (Corollary 3). First, BBPD makes first-period prices more symmetric in relation
to the uniform pricing, no matter if the equilibrium is symmetric or asymmetric. Moreover, the positive
impact of   on the first-period price set by the high-quality firm is attenuated going from the symmetric
to the asymmetric equilibrium. This is due to the fact that the implementation of the high-margins plus
ODS strategy makes the demand more elastic to price changes compared to the inter-temporally balanced
pricing entailing TDS. Clearly, since the asymmetric inter-temporal strategy is anticipated by consumers,
the high-quality firm enjoys less power than in the case of myopic consumers. Another evidence in this
direction is that the first-period price of the high-quality firm is lower than the uniform price.22
1.5 Welfare Analysis
The current section presents the e↵ects of BBPD on firms’ and consumers’ welfare. In order to provide
this analysis, profits and consumer surplus resulting under BBPD are compared with the benchmark case
of no BBPD, which serves to isolate the impact of price discrimination. Welfare analysis gives di↵erent
results according to the farsightedness of consumers. Indeed, as hinted when discussing first-period prices,
consumers’ anticipation of future scenarios makes the high-margin strategy implemented by firm H less
e↵ective in reducing price competition. The following two subsections explain these e↵ects in detail.
1.5.1 Myopic Consumers
Firms’ Profits. First, let us consider the impact the use of BBPD has on firms’ profits. According
to the results shown in Proposition 2, firms will enjoy di↵erent profits at equilibrium depending on the
di↵erence in quality. Leaving all technical details to the appendix, the comparison of profits attained
under BBPD with the ones resulting in the benchmark case of Section 1.3, it is very easy to verify the
following proposition.
22Concerning the exit of the low-quality firm, results are very similar to the case of myopic consumers, as can be seen in
the appendix.
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Proposition 4. If consumers are myopic, price discrimination according to the past purchase behaviour
will be:
(i) detrimental for both firms if TDS occurs and   2 [0,min{ ¯,  ˜}),
(ii) beneficial for the low-quality firm and detrimental for the high-quality firm if  ¯ >  ˜ and   2 [ ˜,  ¯]
(iii) beneficial for both firms if ODS occurs and   < 0.98.
where  ˜ ⌘ 60  81
p
(27 20 )2(16 (20  61)+765)
2(4 (20  61)+189)
Proof. See Appendix.
Point (i) tells that low levels of vertical di↵erentiation yield the firms-damaging scenario shown in the
traditional literature of BBPD. In particular, assuming   to be zero replicates the results of Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000). Things change radically when firms are assumed to be su ciently asymmetric. In
particular, as vertical di↵erentiation becomes stronger, the high-quality firm is given the choice to decide
the destiny of the low-quality competitor. The equilibrium price configuration sees the high-quality firm
implementing a fat cat strategy, consisting in being ino↵ensive today in order to induce a favourable
response of the rival. This scenario will be always profit-enhancing compared to the uniform pricing case
because reduces price competition in the first period and yields the exit (or, at least, the cornering) of
the low-quality opponent. Therefore, the high-quality firm enjoys high margins on a small market in the
first period and conquers the entire second-period market without excessive e↵ort in terms of prices.
This strategy gives the small rival the opportunity to obtain a large first-period market share, without
the need to charge an extremely low price. This is clearly beneficial in the early competition, but it
becomes harmful in the second period. When the high-quality invades its territory, the low-quality firm
only loses market share and often exits the market. The balance between these two opposite forces is
always positive for the low-quality seller, no matter if he survives or exits the market. At a first sight, firm
L being happier out of the market can be counterintuitive. Nevertheless, when the di↵erence in quality is
very pronounced, the uniform price outcome is not so appealing for this firm, which would serve a niche
of the market at a low price. Therefore, the ODS scenario gives to the low-quality firm the possibility to
get a level of profits that would not be reached in the benchmark case, not even in two periods.
Consumer Surplus. This paragraph provides the analysis on the e↵ects of BBPD on consumer surplus.
In what follows, U ij(x) refers to the inter-temporal utility of a consumer located at x who buys good j
in the first period and good i in the second one, with possibly i 6= j in case of switching in the second
period. This utility will be equal to:
U ij(x) = qj   pj1   |x  lj |+  (qi   pij2   |x  li|) where i, j 2 {H,L}.
Indeed, the consumer above enjoys quality i product in the first period and quality j in the second one,
pays the respective prices and bears the respective transportation cost to reach the supplier location. If
i = j, the consumer above is loyal to firm j in both periods so that the total transportation cost becomes
2|x  lj |, lj being the location of firm j. Oppositely, when i 6= j the consumer switches from firm j to firm
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i in the second period and the transportation cost is faced in the whole segment. The total consumer
surplus is given by the sum of utilities of all consumers:
CS =
loyalHZ
0
UHH(x)dx+
1Z
loyalL
ULL(x)dx+
loyalLZ
sL
UHL(x)dx+
sHZ
loyalH
ULH(x)dx,
where loyalH = min{xˆ1, xˆH2 }, loyalL = max{xˆ1, xˆL2 }, sL = min{xˆ1, xˆL2 } and sH = max{xˆ1, xˆH2 }. The
first two terms in the sum represents the surplus for loyalists whereas the second ones are taken by
switchers.23 Comparing the consumer surplus under BBPD with the one obtained under uniform pricing,
we find the net e↵ect of BBPD on surplus, which is presented in the following proposition
Proposition 5. If consumers are myopic, price discrimination according to the past purchase behaviour:
(i) will increase consumer surplus if TDS happens,
(ii) will decrease consumer surplus if ODS happens.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this very sharp result is nothing but the other side of the coin of the discussion
made for firms. The more symmetric firms are, the more BBPD brings to an intensification of competition
benefiting consumers in terms of lower prices. When instead vertical di↵erentiation becomes strong,
consumer surplus is gradually eroded due to the mitigated first-period price competition and to the exit
of the low-quality firm.
1.5.2 Forward-Looking Consumers
Again, in order to look at the e↵ects of BBPD on firms’ profits, we compare BBPD profits with the ones
resulting in the benchmark case of Section 1.3 The results are contained in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If consumers are forward-looking, price discrimination according to past purchase be-
haviour will be:
(i) detrimental for both firms if TDS occurs and   2 [0,min{ ¯FL,  ˜FL}),
(ii) beneficial for the low-quality firm and detrimental for the high-quality firm if ODS-to-H occurs or
if TDS occurs and   2 [ ˜FL,  ¯FL].
where  ˜FL ⌘ 3 
(27 11 )
⇣
2
p
117  (37 8 ) 3(7  )
⌘
27  (23  22) .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 highlights how the high-quality firm su↵ers the asymmetric BBPD equilibrium. In
particular, the same mechanism that gives a very powerful tool in the hands high-quality firm when
consumers are myopic turns out to be a condemn when consumers are forward-looking. Here, the low-
quality firm sets a very low price in the first period and the high-quality firm is “forced” to postpone
the attack to tomorrow. Oppositely, when consumers are myopic the high-quality firm sets a high price
23 When consumers are myopic, their discount factor in the first period is implicitly assumed to be 0. Thus the consumer’s
utility is computed as a non-weighted sum of per-period utilities.
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in the first period enjoying ODS tomorrow and the rival “enjoys” the reduced price competition in the
first period. This strategy gives the lower-quality rival the opportunity to obtain a large first-period
market share and this is always positive and more than compensate the lost of market share su↵ered in
the second period. On the other hand, the loss su↵ered by the high-quality firm is captured not only by
the low-quality firm but also by the consumers.
Proposition 7. If consumers are forward-looking, price discrimination according to past purchase be-
haviour will always increase consumer surplus.
Proof. See Appendix.
Indeed, in aggregate terms they enjoy a higher surplus than under the uniform pricing because most
of them pay a relative low price in the first period to the low-quality firm and then switch at a relative
low price to the high-quality supplier.
1.6 Conclusion
Despite the issues in terms of privacy created by the access of firm to consumer specific information,
BBPD literature has been in favour of consumers recognition due to the fact that consumers benefit from
it in terms of lower prices and increased competition. In particular, the main message of Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) is the same sent by the traditional price discrimination literature in oligopolistic markets:
once firms can discriminate prices, they su↵er a more intense competition, leading to lower prices and a
positive e↵ect for consumer surplus.
This paper participates in the debate arguing that the result above does not necessarily hold anymore
if firms are vertically di↵erentiated. When firms are asymmetric enough, the incentives that BBPD
involves for the two firms are dramatically divergent. On the one hand, the possibility of discriminating
prices is a powerful tool in the hands of the high-quality seller, who exploits asymmetry to attack very
e caciously the competitor’s inherited market in the late competition. Earlier, the low-quality seller
anticipates how tough will be to resist to this powerful second-period attack. For this reason, he mainly
focuses on conquering a large first-period market, essentially ignoring how this will a↵ect second-period
competition.
Having these very di↵erent objectives, firms reach endogenously a market sharing agreement, allocat-
ing the surplus over time in an asymmetric way. In the first period, the high-quality firm makes high
margins out of fewer consumers than the ones that would have been attracted in the uniform pricing
equilibrium. In doing that, it basically accommodates the conquest of a relatively large market by the
low-quality firm. This will lead to the exit of the latter from the market in the second period, as the
strong rival uses price discrimination to induce switching of all its inherited clients.
In this asymmetric outcome, the high-quality firm trades first-period with second-period market share
and the low-quality firm does exactly the opposite, suggesting a possible collusive behaviour of firms.
Indeed, when consumers are myopic, this dynamically unbalanced equilibrium is preferred by both firms,
as it reduces price competition in the early stage (and the low-quality firm benefits from it) and allows for
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the cheap conquest of rival market by the high-quality firm. The other side of the coin is represented by the
peculiar e↵ects on the consumer surplus. Di↵erently from the traditional BBPD literature, discrimination
results in a reduction of consumer surplus in the asymmetric case. As a consequence, if protecting
consumer surplus is the antitrust authority’s criterion, an important policy implication of the paper is
that BBPD should be banned in markets exhibiting strong asymmetries.
Di↵erently, when buyers are forward-looking, the discriminatory price always enhances consumer
surplus. In the symmetric equilibrium, this result is similar to the traditional BBPD literature, in which
firms both attack rival’s inherited territories and this turns out to be eventually negative for them and
positive for consumers. In the asymmetric equilibrium, this is due to the fact that the elasticity of the
first-period demand is higher than under uniform price. Indeed, forward-looking consumers are able to
foresee two things. First, they anticipate that trading market shares over time, firms want to relax price
competition in the first period. Second, tomorrow’s o↵er of the high-quality firm will be less attractive
than the ones both firms o↵er in the symmetric case, as the ODS equilibrium allows for a relatively cheap
attraction of switchers by the strong firm. For this reason, they will respond more intensely to any price
decrease. As a consequence, the low-quality is more aggressive than in the case of myopic consumers, to
the detriment of the high-quality seller.
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2Behaviour-Based Price
Discrimination with Cross Group
Externalities
Abstract
This paper analyses the practice of firms to o↵er di↵erent prices to consumers according to the past
purchase behaviour (BBPD) in the context of two-sided markets. In a two-period model, two platforms
compete for heterogeneous firms and consumers. Platforms are allowed to discriminate prices on the
consumers’ side according to their past purchase behaviour. When first-period market shares are taken
as given, the presence of externalities makes two-direction switching less likely compared to the case of a
one-sided market. Second-period competition is strengthened compared to the case in which a uniform
price is charged in both sides, whereas in the first period it is relaxed if firms exhibit weaker externalities
than consumers, intensified otherwise. The overall e↵ect on inter-temporal profits of platforms is negative,
confirming the previous results of BBPD literature.
2.1 Introduction
When a firm knows the identity of its customers, it often decides to charge new customers with a lower
price in order to conquer new demand. As pointed out by Taylor (2003), price discrimination based
on past purchases, called behaviour based price discrimination (BBPD), is very common in subscription
markets. In these industries, since transactions are never anonymous, a firm knows the identity of current
consumers and can propose low introductory prices to whom did not buy its product in the past.
Discounts take di↵erent forms such as low introductory prices, trial memberships and free installations.
As mentioned in Caillaud and De Nijs (2014), a new subscriber for 3 months to the French newspaper
“Le Monde”, pays 50 euros whereas a previous customer is charged 131.30 euros. Similar o↵ers are the
free trial memberships to software applications as well as online contents platforms such as Spotify and
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Amazon.1 Moreover, first subscriptions to credit cards2 and TVs/internet services are often o↵ered for
free.
All these services have the common feature that subscribers are not the only customers, as business is
also made on merchants (credit cards), advertisers (media) and content providers (online platforms). In
economic jargon, these markets are run by two-sided platforms allowing the interaction between di↵erent
groups of customers linked to each other by cross-group externalities. Think for example to credit cards.
A cardholder’s utility is increasing in the number of shops where she can use it and merchants are in turn
more willing to pay to hold a card reader as the number of card users increases.
Because of the presence of the externalities, one of the distinctive features of these markets is the
pricing rule, which is di↵erent from the general rule that applies in a one-sided framework (i.e., market
without externalities). Back to the example of credit cards, the subscription fee charged to the cardholders
a↵ects not only the demand in this group, but also the willingness to pay of merchants to hold an EPOS.
This is the basic reason for the observation of a cross-group price discrimination, as the price charged
to each group of agents depends on the cross externalities, so that a group whose participation entails
a large participation of the other group will be charged less. According to this discussion, in many
subscription markets two kinds of strategies are used by competing platforms: the mentioned cross-group
price discrimination typical of a two-sided market and the within-group BBPD in subscribers’ side.
These strategies have a common feature: platforms have some information about the characteristics of
various groups of customers and exploit this information setting targeted prices to each group. However,
the type of information required to implement these strategies is fundamentally di↵erent. On the one
hand, to engage in cross-group price discrimination, platforms simply sort customers according to their
externalities. On the other hand, within-group BBPD requires platforms to know the identity and the
behaviour of customers.
This paper provides a two-sided market analysis investigating the e↵ects of within-group BBPD on
switching behaviour, prices and platforms’ profits. In particular, in a two-period model, after a first
round of purchases, platforms are allowed to price-discriminate on the subscribers’ side according to their
past purchase behaviour. The model is solved by backward induction and the analysis is two-fold. In
the sub-game analysis, the market shares of first period are taken as given and the paper provides an
analysis of all possible equilibria. In particular, di↵erent switching behaviours arise depending on the first
period equilibrium and, in turn, on the strength of externalities. Namely, the stronger the externalities,
the less likely to observe two-direction switching (TDS) and vice-versa. The inter-temporal equilibrium
is then provided and the resulting prices and profits are compared with a benchmark case in which price
discrimination is not allowed. The main findings are two. Second-period competition is strengthened
1 From Amazon website “Amazon Prime members in the U.S. can enjoy instant videos: unlimited, commercial-free,
instant streaming of thousands of movies and TV shows through Amazon Instant Video at no additional cost. Members
who own Kindle devices can also choose from thousands of books – including more than 100 current and former New York
Times Bestsellers – to borrow and read for free, as frequently as a book a month with no due dates, from the Kindle Owners’
Lending Library. Eligible customers can try out a membership by starting a free trial”.
2 Taylor (2003) also mentions a 1998 Wall Street Journal ’s article by Bailey and Kilman reported that “the 60% of all
Visa and MasterCard solicitations include a “teaser” (low introductory rate) on balances transferred from a card issued by
another bank”.
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compared to the case in which a uniform price is charged in both sides of the market, whereas in the
first period it is relaxed if subscribers exhibit stronger externalities than firms, intensified otherwise. The
overall e↵ect of BBPD on inter-temporal profits of platforms is unambiguously negative, confirming the
previous results of the one-sided literature.
Related literature. This paper is naturally linked to the two-sided market literature, initially for-
malised by Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003). The main
result around which this literature is built on is the cross-group price discrimination, which follows the
concept of Divide and Conquer firstly proposed by Caillaud and Jullien (2003). In order to develop a
business, a platform o↵ers a low (often below-cost) price to one side of the market and thus restores its
losses by charging a relatively high price to the other side. As in Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong
(2006), the present paper proposes a Hotelling model, to capture the idea that customers exhibit het-
erogeneous preferences over rival platforms. The model focuses on the simplest case in which platforms
charge only a fee independent of the number of interactions with the other side3 and customers can join
at most one platform.4
On the other side, the paper is strongly related with BBPD literature, which main finding is that
discrimination is beneficial for consumers, as firms compete more strongly in prices and poach each
other’s consumers. In particular, the model is built on Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), who provide a
Hotelling model played twice, allowing firms to know whether a customer in the second period is new
or old. Villas-Boas (1999) provide an infinite time model with overlapping generations of consumers
while Esteves (2010) presents di↵erent distributions of consumers types. In di↵erent setups, they all
agree on the result that customer’s recognition and consequent price discrimination hurt firms compared
to a situation in which the targeted pricing is not possible. Even if a firm alone prefers to obtain the
information and so use it to benefit from a surplus extraction, if both get it, then a market stealing e↵ect
tends to prevail.
In recent years, first investigations of within-group price discrimination have been presented, both
from an empirical and a theoretical viewpoint. Gil and Riera-Crichton (2011) and Angelucci et al. (2013)
provide empirical analysis respectively on Spanish TV and French newspaper industries. The first paper
is mainly focused on the relationship between competition and price discrimination, while the second one
studies how advertisement revenues a↵ect price discrimination on the readers’ side. Both competition
and advertisement revenues are found to have a negative impact on the likelihood of medias to use price
discrimination. From a theoretical point of view, Liu and Serfes (2013) is close to the present paper in
that both analyse within-group price discrimination. In particular, they allow platforms to engage in
perfect price discrimination within both sides of the market. Their main finding is that discrimination
3The literature distinguishes between subscription fee and usage fee. In the analysis of the media market of Ferrando
et al. (2008) is pointed out how, while readers are charged with the price of the newspaper, advertiser are charged on
per-reader basis.
4As a matter of fact, literature points out how often at least one side decides to multi-home, i.e. to join more than one
platform. Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007) provide an analysis on the reasons and on the e↵ects of
multi-homing on platforms competition.
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might be a tool to neutralise cross-group externalities with a positive e↵ect on prices and platforms’
profits. There are two main di↵erences with the present work. First, they only consider one period,
keeping the past behaviour of consumers and market’s shares as given. Second, they analyse the case of
perfect price discrimination rather than discrimination based on past purchase behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next section introduces the main features of the
model. After, section 2.3 is devoted to the analysis of the model. Section 2.4 concludes the paper.
2.2 The model
Two competing platforms j = A,B aim at selling a service to two di↵erent groups of customers, sub-
scribers and firms.5 Both subscribers and firms are assumed to be uniformly distributed along a unit
segment. In turn, platforms’ locations are kept fixed at the end-points of this segment, i.e., platform A’s
location is lA = 0, while platform B is located at lB = 1.
A side-i agent enjoys some utility u from joining a platform, faces a transportation cost normalised
to 1 per unit of distance covered6 and receives a benefit measured by the parameter ↵i 2 (0, 1) for each
side-i agent joining the same platform. According to these assumptions, the per-period utility of a side i
agent located at x who joins platform j will be:
U ji (x) = u+ ↵in
j
i0   pji  
  x  lj   where i 2 {S, F}, i0 6= i, (2.1)
and nji0 is the total number of the other side’s agents joining platform j. Platforms seek to maximise
inter-temporal profits, bearing a unitary cost ci to put a side i’s customer “on board” and not discounting
the future. The time-profit is simply given by the sum of the products between the price charged to each
group and the number of joiners belonging to the same group. Thus, the time profit of platform j when
charging prices pji to each side i is indicated in equation by the following:
⇡j =
X
i=S,F
(pji   ci)nji . (2.2)
Each time period is composed of two stages. In stage (1.1) platforms simultaneously set first-period
fees to subscribers (pAS1, p
B
S1) and firms (p
A
F1,p
B
F1) and in stage (1.2) customers decide which platform
to join. In time 2, platforms simultaneously set prices knowing who subscribed to which platform. pjAS2
represents the price set by firm j for an A-subscriber in period 1, while pjBS2 is charged to B’s inherited
clients. Firms are instead charged with a uniform price in the second period as well as in the first one
(pAF2,p
B
F2). In the very last stage (2.2), after having observed the new fees, firms and subscribers join the
preferred platform.
5Hereafter, the paper uses indi↵erently the words subscribers, consumers, group S or side S. Similarly, firms are also
called side or group F throughout the paper.
6The assumption of a common transportation cost equal to 1 is made in order to keep notation as simple as possible,
but the intuition behind the results provided in the paper remains the same even assuming side-dependent transportation
costs.
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Three main assumptions are used throughout the paper: (i) the utility u is big enough so that every
agent prefers to join at least one platform instead of joining none (Full Market Coverage); (ii) each agent
joins at most one platform (Single-Homing); (iii) profit functions are concave. As shown in Armstrong
and Wright (2007), single-homing in both sides is the case when 1 > max{↵S ,↵F }, meaning that agents
are interested in reaching the other side, but not so much to decide to join both platforms and bear price
and transportation cost twice. Moreover, 1 > 2 (↵S + ↵F )
2 is the condition needed for the profits to be
concave in prices.
2.3 Analysis
This section provides a complete analysis of the model. In particular, it firstly introduces and explains
the benchmark case in which customer’s recognition is not allowed in the next subsection. Subsequently,
Subsection 2.3.2 describes the possible equilibria when platforms are allowed to engage in BBPD and
compares the results of the two regimes.
2.3.1 No BBPD
Assume there exists a ban on price discrimination or that customers cannot be recognised. In this
scenario, platforms cannot distinguish between old and new subscribers, and thus can only engage in
cross-side but not within-side price discrimination, i.e., pjjS2 = p
ji
S2 = p
j
S2. This would imply that the
oligopoly competition in prices takes the form of a two-period repeated game in which nothing changes
from the first to the second period. For this reason, the solution of the repeated game is nothing more
than the solution of the per period game, with prices pAS , p
A
F , p
B
S , p
B
F in both time periods.
According to the utility defined in equation (2.1), given prices pAS , p
A
F and p
B
S , p
B
F the locations x¯i of
the side i consumer indi↵erent between the two platforms will be:
x¯i =
1
2
+
pBi   pAi + ↵i(pBi0   pAi0 )
2
where i0 6= i.
Given these expectations on joining decisions, platform j maximizes the following profits choosing the
prices pjS and p
j
F :
⇧j = (1 +  )
h
(pjS   cS)|x¯S   lj |+ (pjF   cF )|x¯F   lj |
i
.
Using the first-order conditions of these two problems, the equilibrium prices in the two sides are the
following:
p¯AS = p¯
B
S = cS + 1  ↵F and p¯AF = p¯BF = cF + 1  ↵S . (2.3)
These prices result in the market splitting locations x¯S = x¯F = 1/2 and in the following equilibrium
profits:
⇧¯A = ⇧¯B = ⇧¯ = (1 +  )

1  ↵S + ↵F
2
 
. (2.4)
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2.3.2 BBPD in subscribers’ side
In this section, first-period prices as well as the identity of subscribers are assumed to be observable to
both platforms when they choose second-period fees. Sub-game perfection is the equilibrium concept. In
stage (2.2) both firms and subscribers observe all prices and decide which platform to join.
Subscribers. In what follows, xA2 represents the location of that first-period A’s subscriber who is
indi↵erent between switching to the rival or being loyal for given prices pAAS2 and p
BA
S2 o↵ered to him.
Following the same reasoning, xB2 is the location of the indi↵erent first-period B-joiner. Simply equalizing
utilities in both turfs, the two cuto↵s will be:
xj2 =
1
2
+
↵SnAF2   ↵SnBF2 + pBjS2   pAjS2
2
with j 2 {A,B}. (2.5)
Assume the population of subscribers to split in time 1 at location xS1, so that all consumers located
below this cuto↵ joined platform A and all the ones above joined platform B. Therefore, the number
of subscribers switching from platform A to platform B is given by nBAS2 = max{xS1   xA2 , 0}, while
nABS2 = max{xB2   xS1, 0} move towards the other direction. The remaining nAAS2 = min{xA2 , xS1} and
nBBS2 = min{1  xB2 , 1  xS1} are loyal respectively to platform A and platform B.
Firms. Firms take their decision following the same reasoning as users. They observe prices o↵ered
by both platforms and form expectations about how many consumers will subscribe to each platform.
According to the discussion of last paragraph, the total number of subscribers to platform j is the sum
of loyalists njjS2 and switchers n
jj0
S2 . Firms correctly anticipate the switching behaviour of the other side.
By simple comparisons of utilities, the indi↵erent firm is located at:
xF2 =
1
2
+ ↵F
✓
nAAS2 + n
AB
S2  
1
2
◆
+
1
2
 
pBF2   pAF2
 
. (2.6)
Platform B
Platform A
Users’ side Firms’ side
0 0
1 1
xA2
xS1 xF2
xB2
Figure 1: TDS
Platform B
Platform A
Users’ side Firms’ side
0 0
1 1
xS1
nAF2
xB2
Figure 1: ODS
All firms located below this cuto↵ will join platform A (i.e., nAF2 = xF2) and all above will prefer
platform B (nBF2 = 1   xF2). We can have two di↵erent cases. In the first one, platforms expect some
bi-directional movements of consumers in the second period, i.e., they expect Two-Direction Switching
30
Pricing Based on Consumers’ Behaviour and Interconnections
(TDS). Formally, it means that the cuto↵s in equation (2.5) are located in such a way that xA2 < xS1 < x
B
2 ,
as depicted in Figure 1 below. If instead platforms expect switching to be One-Direction (ODS) towards
platform A, they expect the cuto↵s in (2.5) to be located in such a way that xS1  xA2 and xS1 < xB2
as depicted in Figure 2. According to these expectations, the maximisation problems of the platforms
change dramatically and give di↵erent equilibrium prices, summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. Assume that nAS1 = xS1 and n
B
S1 = 1   xS1 side S agents subscribed respectively to
platform A and B in the past, then the equilibrium prices will be:
1. If TDS is expected:
piiS2 = cS +
5
12   ↵F +
 
1
2 + 2⇤
 
niS1   ⇤,
pijS2 = cS +
13
12   ↵F   ( 32   2⇤)niS1   ⇤, with i 2 {A,B} and i 6= j
piF2 = cF + 1  ↵S + 2⌦niS1   ⌦,
where ⇤ ⌘ 3(3 2↵S(2↵S+↵F ))4(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F )) 2 (0, 12 ) and ⌦ ⌘
(↵S ↵F )
4(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F )) .
2. If ODS to platform i is expected:
qiiS2 = 1 +  n
i
S1, q
ji
S2 = 0.
qijS2 = cS + 1  (1 + )niS1   ↵F , qjjS2 = cS + 1  (1  )niS1   ↵F ,
qAF2 = cF + 1  ↵S + (2↵S    )niS1, qBF2 = cF + 1  ↵S +  niS1,
where  ⌘ 3(1 ↵F↵S)9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F ) ,   ⌘
2((4↵S ↵F )+↵2S(↵S+2↵F ))
9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F ) and
  ⌘
⇣
2↵S(↵F ↵S)
9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F )   2
⌘
.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to better grasp the intuition behind Proposition 8 let us consider the equilibrium prices in
point 1, which describes the symmetric equilibrium in which both platforms steal rival’s consumers in
the second period.
First, the own inherited number of subscribers a↵ects positively the price a given platform charges to
the old loyal consumers and negatively the one o↵ered to the switchers. Intuitively, the relation between
prices and inherited subscriptions follows directly from the e↵ective power that the size of the first-period
market creates in each turf for the “attacking” (else turf) and the “defending” firm (own turf). Clearly,
the attack in the rival turf turns out to be more costly as the size of the market already conquered in
the first period becomes higher. In other words, the price o↵ered to the switchers should be lower when
a lot of consumers were attracted in the first period, since the non-conquered portion is very far away
in the Hotelling line. Therefore, from the point of view of the defending firm, the higher the market
share inherited from the past the weaker the price competition in its own turf, as the rival becomes less
aggressive. For this reason, the equilibrium price for loyalists is increasing in the inherited market share.
On the other hand, how the inherited number of subscribers a↵ects the equilibrium price chosen in
firms’ side ultimately depends on the relative strength of externalities between the two sides. If firms are
more interested in meeting consumers than the other way around (i.e., ↵F > ↵S), then the equilibrium
prices for firms decreases with the number of inherited consumers. In this case, competition for users is
very strong and switching is mainly due to o↵ers in the subscribers’ side. Since firms expect switching
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movements towards the small-sized platform, they are willing to pay less as the number of inherited
subscribers increases. Di↵erently, if users are more interested than firms in the interaction, the latter
are charged more as the inherited market increases. In this case, since competition for subscribers is
less intense, switching is mainly driven by a decrease in the price o↵ered to firms. This decrease will be
weaker as the inherited number of users increases, since the incentives to attract new subscriptions are
lower (smaller potential market to conquer).
Point 2 describes situations in which it becomes too costly for a platform j 6= i to attract new
subscribers: even o↵ering a price equal to 0 (i.e., lower than the marginal cost) is not su cient to
attract anybody. Therefore, the defending firm (firm i) can charge a price for inherited subscriptions just
su cient to keep all of them. All the other prices (in the other turf and in the other side) keep the same
qualitative features of the symmetric case. These equilibrium prices will determine peculiar switching
behaviours of consumers. If a platform attracted many subscribers, it will find it too costly to attract
the small residual number of rival’s ones and more di cult to retain old ones, as formally stated in the
following corollary.
Corollary 6. Given the equilibrium prices in Proposition 8:
1. If xS1 2 (xˆ, 1  xˆ), with xˆ ⌘ 16 + 112(9 2(2↵F+↵S)(↵F+2↵S)) , then TDS occurs.
2. If xS1  xˆ (respectively xS1   1  xˆ), then ODS occurs towards platform A (resp. B).
3. The presence of externalities reduces the length of the interval of inherited market splitting location
compatible with TDS compared with the case of a one-sided market.
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to these reasonings, the inherited market splitting location should be symmetric enough for TDS
to occur,7 while an unbalanced market implies that switching occurs from the “strong” to the “weak”
platform. The likelihood of the TDS equilibrium to arise depends on the strength of externalities, through
the positive e↵ect that ↵S and ↵F have on the cuto↵ xˆ. Moreover, since the externality parameters are
bound by 0 from below xˆ is always higher than 14 .
8
Two main considerations can be made. On the one hand, the higher the externalities, the narrower
the interval allowing TDS. On the other hand, compared to a one-sided market, TDS is less likely to
occur and, if externalities are particularly strong, even a slight inherited asymmetry might determine the
impossibility of TDS to occur. This is due to the fact that, in the presence of externalities, platforms face
a cross-side coordination problem that emphasises the e↵ects of inherited asymmetries on the second-
period switching behaviour of customers. Namely, the incentives for the “weak” platform to be aggressive
in the rival’s turf are stronger than in a one-sided market, as the gain coming from new subscriptions is
also associated with the attraction of new firms. For the same reason, the cost for the “strong” platform
7 In the analysis of their two periods model of BBPD in a one-sided market, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) use exactly
this assumption to solve backward the model.
8In an unpublished paper Gehrig et al. (2007) provide an analysis of the BBPD with inherited market shares and finding
how xˆ is equal to 14 in a one-sided market, which corresponds to the case with ↵S ,↵F = 0 in the present model.
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to attract some of the residual customers is higher in a two-sided market, as both sides have to be carried
“on-board”.
To conclude this paragraph, it is worth noticing what happens when the inherited market is perfectly
symmetric. The results will be summarised in the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Assume that nAS1 = n
B
S1 = 1/2, then:
1. the second-period equilibrium prices will be:
piiS2 = cS +
2
3   ↵F , pijS2 = cS + 13   ↵F , piF2 = cF + 1  ↵S
2. TDS will occur.
In this case, the market is symmetric enough to have TDS and prices take into account the externality
they create on the other side of the market. In particular, since the attraction of an additional subscriber
makes firms more willing to pay for a factor ↵F , each subscriber is rewarded in that measure. More
comments on prices will be done when they are compared with the benchmark case of the intra-side
uniform price.
First period. This paragraph is devoted to the analysis of first-period decisions. Two main assumptions
are made in the following analysis. First, what follows relies on the fact both platforms expect TDS to
occur tomorrow. This is mainly required for the results to be “readable” and interpretable and follows the
idea of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) of symmetric (enough) market shares in the first period. Secondly,
consumers are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they only care about the utility they get at stage (1.2), without
anticipating the second period (possible) switching. Myopia here is assumed just in order to keep the
analysis as simple as possible. Accordingly, by simple comparison of utilities, the indi↵erent side-i agent
will be located at:
xi1 =
1
2
+
↵i
2t
 
nAi01   nBi01
 
+
1
2t
(pBi1   pAi1), with i 2 {S, F}, i 6= i0,
and under full market coverage, it holds that the total numbers of customers joining respectively platform
A and platform B will be nAi1 = xi1 and n
B
i1 = 1   xi1. Taking into account that both sides correctly
anticipate the other side participation, the indi↵erent indi↵erent agent is side i will be located at:
xi1 =
1
2
+
↵i
 
pBi01   pAi01
 
+ t(pBi1   pAi1)
t2   ↵i↵i0 , with i 2 {S, F}, i 6= i
0.
First-period prices chosen by platforms have an e↵ect not only on current profits but also on second
period profits, as the market share of period 1 determines second-period. Indeed, having a high number
of previous subscribers today reduces the possibilities both to steal customers from the rival and to retain
old customers overcoming the poaching attempted by the rival. As demonstrated in the appendix, we
will have the following equilibrium:
33
Pricing Based on Consumers’ Behaviour and Interconnections
Proposition 9. When platforms expect symmetry, the equilibrium is characterised by:
1. subscription fees equal to pAS1 = p
B
S1 = cS + 1  ↵F +  (3 2↵S ↵F )(↵S ↵F )3(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(2↵F+↵S) ,
2. firms’ prices equal to pAF1 = p
B
F1 = cF + 1  ↵S,
3. xS1 = xF1 = xF2 = 1/2 and xA2 = 1  xB2 = 1/3.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 9 summarises the main characteristics of the equilibrium first-period prices and their
e↵ects on the first-period price competition and the second-period switching behaviour. Unsurprisingly,
the market splits in the first period at locations 1/2 in both sides of the markets. Moreover, 1/6 of
subscribers switch platform in the second period and 1/3 of them remain loyal,9 whereas no switching
occurs in the firms side going from the first to the second period. Concerning the prices in both period
and their comparison with the intra-side uniform pricing, the results are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 10. Allowing platforms to price subscribers according to their past purchase behaviour will
entail:
(i) same first- and second-period prices in firms’ side,
(ii) lower second-period prices for subscribers,
(iii) higher (lower) first-period prices for subscribers if they have stronger (weaker) externalities,
(iv) lower inter-temporal profits.
Proof. See Appendix.
Two main e↵ects are playing a role in the determination of optimal prices when platforms engage in
within-group price discrimination.
On the one hand, knowing the identity of subscribers pushes firms to compete fiercely in the second
period in order to steal each other’s consumers (poaching e↵ect) and to “defend” their inherited market
from rival’s attack. This poaching e↵ect has clear-cut negative e↵ects on second period prices charged
to subscribers (point (ii) of Proposition 10). On the other hand, this e↵ect goes towards a reduction of
first-period competition, as being aggressive in the first period entails a relative disadvantage in terms of
tomorrows’ conquest of new subscriptions.
On the other hand, any price cut in one side of the market involves a positive e↵ect on other side’s
participation (externality e↵ect). This is captured by the terms  ↵j found in all prices, which are
nothing more than the “rewards” that a side i agent receives for the externality that his presence in the
platform creates in side j. For this reason, the group exhibiting the lower externality becomes a loss
leader and is basically subsidised by the other group, on which platforms mostly make profits: this is the
so-called “Divide and Conquer” strategy typical of two-sided markets. The intuitive result coming from
the externality e↵ect is that the symmetry of the model brings to a situation in which firms are charged
9The switchers towards platform A are located between 2/3-1/2, whereas 1/2-1/3 go towards platform B. The remaining
agents closer to the extremes remain loyal.
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precisely in the same way both under within-group uniform pricing and price discrimination (point (i)
of Proposition 10). This depends on the occurrence that subscriptions are equally split between the two
platforms, and thus firms willingness to pay is the same in both regimes. In the second period, switching
determines a change in “who” joins each network, but platforms steal each other the same number of
subscribers, keeping the aggregate market shares unchanged.
The interplay between externality and poaching e↵ect determines point (iii) of Proposition 10. With
the two e↵ects discussed above in mind, the result is rather intuitive. In the first period, the main trade-o↵
faced by platforms is an inter-temporal one. Indeed, they can either compete fiercely in order to conquer
a large first-period market or make high margins postponing the attack to the rival’s territory. The
balance between these two opposite forces ultimately depends on the relative strength of externalities.
Assume subscribers to exhibit stronger externalities than firms, i.e., ↵S > ↵F . Therefore, the optimal
“Divide and Conquer” strategy in the early competition will be to charge firms with a very low price
and then make profits on the subscribers. In this case, the temptation of making high margins on few
subscriptions prevails as BBPD o↵ers the platforms a new opportunity to conquer a large market in the
second period. On the other hand, if ↵F > ↵S platforms “divide” on subscribers’ side and “conquer”
firms’ side, o↵ering a very low price to the former and making profits on the latter. In this situation,
subscribers are the loss-leader segment and there is no advantage in implementing a strategy of high
margins on a small market.
To conclude, the model confirms the idea that profits are lower when competitors discriminate prices,
as platforms are very aggressive in the rival’s turf, a well-known result of one-sided markets BBPD
literature. The only di↵erence going from a one-sided to a two-sided market is on the magnitude of the
loss su↵ered by sellers in the discriminatory regime. According to the discussion about first period prices,
the presence of cross-group network e↵ects emphasises the negative e↵ect of BBPD when this is used in
the group exhibiting lower externalities, whereas it mitigates it when subscribers are strongly interested
in meeting firms.
2.4 Conclusion
The paper provides a two-period model of platform competition, in which the demand is composed by two
sides, firms and subscribers. Platforms are allowed to discriminate prices among subscribers, according
to the fact that BBPD is often used in subscription markets. Cross-group externalities do involve some
e↵ects on prices and competition when platforms charge past and new subscribers with di↵erent fees.
First, when the first-period market shares are taken as given, externalities have a negative impact on
the concrete possibility for two-direction switching to occur. Indeed, the stronger the externalities, the
narrower the interval of inherited market splitting locations compatible with a TDS scenario, since the
maximal market share a platform can inherit compatible with enjoying the attraction of new customers
depends positively on the externalities. When externalities are set to 0 (i.e., one-sided market), the model
replicates the results of the analysis provided by Gehrig et al. (2007).
35
Pricing Based on Consumers’ Behaviour and Interconnections
Secondly, when the first-period decisions are taken into account, platforms face a strategic situation
similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. Each one of them alone has the incentive to o↵er discounted prices for
new subscriptions but, if both of them do it, the level of profits turns out to be lower than the one that
would be reached if they committed not to poach rival’s consumers. This result follows from two reasons.
On the one hand, going from the non-discriminatory to the discriminatory regime entails a loss in the
subscribers side. This loss mainly follows from a decrease in the level of second-period subscription fees,
as platform compete fiercely in order to poach each other’s clients. Moreover, the presence of cross-group
externalities strengthens this loss because of a decrease in first-period subscription fees when firms are
more interested than subscribers in meeting the other side of the market. This is due to the fact that the
latter group is pivotal to attract the former and BBPD make platforms worried about the second-period
attack of the competitor. Oppositely, when subscribers exhibit the highest network externalities, first
period prices are higher under the discriminatory regime, which gives platforms a further possibility to
attract subscribers in the second period. However, even in this second case, the negative e↵ect of BBPD
on second period prices more than compensate the softening of first-period competition, making platforms
worse o↵.
On the other hand, the losses made in the subscribers’ side are not recouped on the firms’ side.
Indeed, the symmetry of the model makes firms indi↵erent between the scenario in which platforms use
within-group price discrimination and uniform subscription fees. This is due to the fact that subscriptions
are equally distributed between the two platforms in the two periods, and thus firms participation does
not vary. In the second period, switching determines a change in the identity of some subscribers, but
their total number (what matters to firms) remains constant over time.
The irrelevance of discounted new subscriptions on the firms’ side is doubtless an important weakness
of the present paper. In the context of two-sided markets models a` la Armstrong with heterogeneity of
consumers in terms of locations and symmetric platforms, this irrelevance result will be always there.
This is because firms expect and anticipate the future bi-directional movements of subscribers from one
platform to the other. Furthermore, even the consideration of multi-homing firms would not modify
the picture. When agents are mostly interested in the interaction with the other group rather than the
product o↵ered by the platforms themselves, they may take the decision to join both platforms in order
to meet the other side. As pointed out by Armstrong (2006), the main implication of this assumption
is that price competition is relaxed in the firms’ side, since it exhibits a lower elasticity to price. In the
present setting, only the sharing of the surplus between platforms and subscribers would be concerned by
BBPD, but again no e↵ect would arise in the firms’ side. In particular, platforms would charge exactly
the same subscription fees found in the analysis above and would behave as monopolists in the firms’
side, both in the within-group discriminatory and uniform price regime.
In order to enrich the results of the present paper and, more in general, of the two-sided market
literature, asymmetries in networks sizes can play a crucial role in the e↵ects of price discrimination on
the welfare of platforms and customers. As pointed out by Chen (2008), Sha↵er and Zhang (2002) and
Liu and Serfes (2005) for one-sided markets, price discrimination may lead to very di↵erent scenarios
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going from symmetric and asymmetric markets. Without assuming any ex-ante asymmetry, Ambrus
and Argenziano (2009) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) find that if consumers are heterogeneous in
terms of the strength of the externalities rather in terms of locations, then asymmetric networks arise
at equilibrium. In particular, Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) demonstrate how platform competition
brings to two vertically di↵erentiated markets (one per side) in which the “quality” of the product sold is
simply given by the size of the network. Their setup allows for the co-existence of asymmetric platforms
in equilibrium, so that if platforms discriminate price to induce switching of one side, this would well
entail some e↵ect in the other side in terms of switching behaviour.
The last point to notice is that the present model assumes myopic customers. Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000) and Villas-Boas (1999) show that if customers are forward-looking the early competition is relaxed,
as knowing that tomorrow it will be possible to switch paying a discounted price reduces price elasticity
today. In the setup proposed by this paper, which already assumes deep rationality, it can be interesting
to see how competition is a↵ected by the fact that both firms and end-users expect platforms to use
within-group price discrimination and take it into account when taking their ex-ante decisions.
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3Pricing in Social Networks under
Limited Information
This paper is a joint work with Simone Righi.
Abstract
We model the choices of a monopolist who faces a partially uninformed population of consumers. She
aims at expanding demand by exploiting his (limited) knowledge about consumers’ social network. She
o↵ers rewards to current clients in order to induce them to activate their social network and to convince
peers to buy the product sold by the company. The program is profitable provided that the monopolist
faces a serious enough informational problem and that the cost of investment in the social network is not
prohibitively high. Price for informed consumers is lowered by the introduction of the reward compared
to the benchmark where no program is run. There are no e↵ects on the price charged to uninformed
consumers. The o↵er of bonuses a↵ects individual incentives of informed people to share information,
determining a minimal degree condition for the costly investment in the social network. The level of
such threshold strongly depends on the distribution of connections in the social network. In random
networks, roughly the more popular half of informed consumers invests, regardless of network density.
On the contrary, in scale-free networks the monopolist faces a clear-cut decision between maximising
margins (running a small referral program) and maximising demand (motivating many informed agents to
communicate). The optimal choice depends on the probability of observing highly-connected individuals
and, in scale-free networks empirically observed, the first alternative would be preferred.
3.1 Introduction
Programs that attribute referral bonuses to customers are an established marketing strategy through
which companies attempt to increase their market penetration. This strategy is e↵ective since consumers
are part of a network of acquaintances and thus can be incentivised to use their social relationships to
di↵use the knowledge about the existence of the company’s product. These programs can be particularly
advantageous when a new product is launched as the market is not well covered and some potential clients
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are unaware of its existence (Sernovitz and Clester 2009).
In the typical referral bonus program, the company o↵ers rewards to its established customers, pro-
vided that they are able to convince some peers to become new clients. In order to obtain rewards old
customers need to invest in their existing social network by informing their peers about the existence of
the product. Depending on their reservation price, newly-informed agents will then decide upon purchase.
Referral bonuses are generally used in markets for subscription goods and services, in both on- and
o↵-line services. In the market for online storage services, Dropbox o↵ers free storage space to clients
that convince their friends to subscribe. According to Huston (2010), founder and CEO of Dropbox, their
referral program extended their client basis by 60% in 2009 and referral was responsible for 35% of new
daily signups. Besides online services, banks o↵er advantageous conditions to old customers introducing
new ones. Better conditions are provided both in the form of higher interest rates on the deposit and
that of lowered service fee. Another form of reward used by banks is to embed the rewarding mechanism
in established customer loyalization schemes1 awarding points in exchange for referrals. Such points can
then be used to claim prizes (mobile phones, televisions etc). Other well-known examples can be found
in markets for massively multiplayer on-line games, payment systems, touristic accommodation, online
content providers and enterprise software solutions.
In all these examples the company provides incentives that target current popular and informed
clients, proposing them to sustain a costly investment with uncertain return. The uncertainty of the
investment in social network follows from two considerations. Firstly, some of the peers contacted may
not be willing to buy the product even once aware of its existence. Secondly, uninformed consumers may
get information about the service from multiple sources while in most referral programs only one person
can receive the resulting bonus. We take into account both these issues when modeling the expectations
of customers considering to activate their social network.
The current literature mainly focuses on pricing in online social networks (Bloch and Que´rou 2013)
and telecommunication services (Shi 2003), where sellers can directly observe the precise structure of
the consumers’ network. Referral programs are a simpler but widely used strategy which only requires
very limited information about consumers’ social interactions. Indeed, in our setup the seller needs only
to be aware of the distribution of the number of connections (degree distribution in the language of
graph theory) of current and prospective clients. Under such a condition, the company cannot price-
discriminate according to the precise position of the consumer in the social network. However, it can
still influence clients’ decisions by setting prices and bonuses so that some of them will have incentive to
di↵use information.
The power of referrals follows from the fact that each player in the market has incentives that favor
the success of this strategy. The producer wants to extend his client base, old customers are motivated
by expected rewards and potential new buyers are given the opportunity to learn about the existence of
a potentially valuable service. Consequently, the structure of incentives of referral marketing strategies
makes them an e↵ective tool in the presence of significant informational problems on the consumers’
1For example UBS at the time of writing this paper.
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side, i.e., when some of the potential customers are unaware of the existence of the product. This
situation is typical when a product or service is relatively new on a market and when the existence
of many specialized markets leads the consumers to a situation of information overload (Zandt 2004).
Mass media advertisement can provide a partial solution to this informational problem. However, it is
well-known (Lazarsfeld and Katz 1955) that information coming from the mass-media is not fully trusted
by consumers, who tend to be more influenced by social neighbours. The strategy we study is thus an
e↵ective and relatively cheap alternative for companies to expand their client base as it allows to harness
the power of customers’ social networks.
In this paper, a monopolist decides upon the introduction of a referral program in the presence
of uninformed consumers. Our setup allows for results along three lines. Firstly, we characterise the
conditions for a rewarding program to be optimal from the producer’s point of view, showing that it is
profitable in almost every reasonable situation (i.e., assuming a significant informational problem and a
limited cost of activating the social network).
Secondly, when the referral program is run, informed buyers see the price they are charged increasing
with time. This increase determines a transfer going from agents receiving many bonuses to agents
receiving fewer or no bonuses. The probability to be on either side will depend on one’s popularity (the
degree) in the consumers’ network. Uninformed consumers are always better o↵ as the program may
provide them with information about potentially valuable goods.
Finally, we characterise the impact of the structure of network interactions among consumers on
the model’s outcomes. We study in particular two broad classes of networks: one where the number
of connections in the population is distributed around an average value (random networks, Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi 1959) and one in which the distribution is power law (scale-free networks, Baraba´si and Albert
1999). Notably, we show that in random networks roughly all people with an above-average degree
will be incentivised to spread information regardless of the density of social interactions or the severity
of the informational problem. On the other hand, scale-free networks give the monopolist a clear-cut
choice: either maximising demand by setting incentives to motivate many informed consumers to invest,
or maximising margins by o↵ering a very small referral reward.
The remaining part of this paper is divided as follows. After discussing the related literature in the
following section, we outline the mathematical aspects of the model in Section 3.3. Then, in Section 3.4,
we provide the equilibrium of the model and we analyze the general implications that can be derived
when the form of the consumers’ network is left implicit. We follow up by providing numerical evidence of
the impact of network topology on the players’ choices (Section 3.5), and finally we draw the conclusions
(Section 3.6).
3.2 Related literature
The solipsistic view of the consumer, which characterised the economic discipline in the past, can be
relaxed considering the single agent as a member of a social group. Indeed, individuals influence and are
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influenced by social behavior through local interactions. The concept of network has been introduced
and applied in a variety of fields. As pointed out in the comprehensive review of Jackson (2005) networks
influence agents’ economic behavior in fields such as decentralized financial markets, labor markets,
criminal behavior and the spread of information and diseases.
In recent years, the attention of industrial economists shifted from the network externalities approach,
following the tradition of Katz and Shapiro (1985), to a new focus on the direct study of the e↵ects of
social interactions on the behavior of economic agents. The new tendency comprise the consideration of
a subset of neighbours rather than the population overall as the main driving force influencing individual
choices (Sundararajan 2006; Banerji and Dutta 2009). The concept of network locality has been used by
Banerji and Dutta (2009) to show the emergence of local monopolies with homogeneous firms competing
in prices, by Bloch and Que´rou (2013) to study the optimal monopoly pricing in on-line social networks
and by Shi (2003) to study pricing in the presence of weak and strong ties in telecommunication markets.
The main concern of the last two papers is price discrimination based on network centrality and on
the strength of social ties respectively. While their models assume a full knowledge of the links among
consumers, the strategy we discuss requires only very limited information. Instead of gathering detailed
information about individuals in order to directly price discriminate, the company o↵ers incentives that
motivate buyers to become channels of information di↵usion.
An alternative approach is to assume that consumers discuss with peers the products they buy and
that this can be taken as given by the sellers when defining their strategies. Along these lines Campbell
(2013) studies optimal pricing when few consumers are initially informed and engage in word-of-mouth
(WOM); Galeotti and Goyal (2009) discuss the optimal target to maximise market penetration with
WOM; and Galeotti (2010) investigates the relationship between interpersonal communication and con-
sumer investments in search. When WOM is taken as given, the key issue for the seller is to assess how
the consumers’ network reacts to any marketing strategy in terms of percolation of information. Instead
of focusing on WOM per-se, our paper discusses communication resulting from a deliberate incentive
scheme predisposed by the monopolist. In other words, the strategy we analyze generates communication
which would not exist otherwise.
The empirical literature has long considered the word-of-mouth. The seminal work of Lazarsfeld and
Katz (1955) formulated the general theory that when people speak with each other and are exposed
to information from media, their decisions are based on what peers say rather than on what media
communicates. They showed that an e↵ective way for companies and governments to reach their goals is
to influence a small minority of opinion leaders, who then tend to spread the message. Arndt (1967) is
among the first scholars to study empirically the short-term sales e↵ects of product-related conversations,
showing that favorable comments lead to an increase in the adoption of new products and vice-versa.
In the di↵usion of product adoptions Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) and Iyengar et al. (2011) point
out the importance of opinion leaders or influential agents. Our paper essentially is in concord with this
empirical observation as the company targets relatively more popular agents in order to increase profits.
The paper is also related to the marketing literature studying referral bonuses. Two papers are worth
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mentioning from a theoretical point of view: Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) and Kornish and Li (2010). The
first one shows that rewards are positively correlated with the share of delighted consumers. Kornish and
Li (2010) argue that the more agents value friends’ utility, the higher is the bonus set by the company,
as long as recommendations cannot be induced with a lower price but with a higher quality product.
Both these papers, however, focus on peculiar consumers’ preferences as drivers for the sellers’ strategy,
disregarding the e↵ects of the existence of a social network among consumers on strategic interactions in
the market.
3.3 The model
We consider a setup where a monopolist sells a non-durable product to a large but finite population N =
{1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , n} of agents. Consumers di↵er according to their willingness to pay and the information
they have. The utility function of an agent i buying the product at price p is defined as:
ui = ri   p.
The reservation price r is uniformly distributed on the support [0, 1] and there are no externalities
from others’ consumption.2 A proportion 1     of consumers is informed about the existence of the
product, while the remaining   is not. Uninformed consumers would never buy the product unless they
passively receive the information from their informed peers. This modelling choice captures the existence
of a di↵erence in consumers’ skills to access and use the available informational tools.
Interactions and communication among consumers are restricted by an existing social network struc-
ture, which we consider as given. In particular, each agent i has a finite number of neighbours Ki ✓ N
to interact with. The degree ki (the number of neighbours) is the cardinality of Ki. We further assume
the consumer’s social network to be undirected, in the sense that if node i is linked to node j, then j is
in turn linked to i. The degree of the agents is distributed according to some p.d.f. f(k), which has to
be interpreted as the fraction of agents having k neighbours. In other terms, upon selecting a random
agent from the social network, the probability that she has exactly k neighbours is f(k). This general
formulation allows for results valid in any interaction structure. Moreover, it is possible to substitute
f(k) with specific networks and to compare results across di↵erent topologies (see Section 3.5).
In a two-period model, the monopolist aims at maximising the sum of inter-temporal profits.3 Defining
D1(p1) as the demand coming from first period buyers and assuming a marginal cost normalized to 0,
the expected profit in that period, obtained charging price p1, will be given by:
⇡1 = p1E(D1(p1)). (3.1)
In the second period of our model, we allow the monopolist to o↵er rewards to old customers through
a referral program. Namely, the monopolist knows the distribution of degrees in the social network and,
2We make this assumption in order to simplify the presentation of the results. Indeed, network externalities could be
introduced in the utility function of the consumers without qualitatively changing the results.
3For the sake of simplicity, we normalise the inter-temporal discount to 1.
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accordingly, o↵ers a gift to the old consumers who inform their friends about the existence of the product
and who convince them to buy it. The rationale for this o↵er is to eliminate the lack of information
which prevents some of the potential consumers from buying the product. This gift takes the form of a
unitary amount b for each successful referral.
Since each new consumer corresponds to one reward b given to an old customer, the margin on the
new second-period buyers is given by (p2   b), where p2 is the price set for the consumers who buy the
product in the second period. Thus, defining D22(p2, b) as the demand in the second period coming from
new consumers and D12 the one coming from previously informed consumers, the expected profit ⇡2 turns
out to be:
⇡2 = p2E(D12(p2)) + (p2   b)E(D22(p2, b)). (3.2)
Function D22(p2, b) takes into account both the indirect positive e↵ect of the bonus on the probability
of new consumers to get informed and the direct negative e↵ect of p2 on their decision to buy the good.
To enjoy rewards, old buyers need to contact their social network, which implies a costly investment of
a fixed amount C.4
It is important to discuss the informational structure of the model as it constitutes a peculiar feature
of our study. Specifically, the information available to agents about the idiosyncratic characteristics of
all the others is summarized in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. Each agent has perfect private information about his own characteristics. Moreover,
the distributions of ri and ki as well as the proportion   are common knowledge and independent from
each other.
Assumption 1 implies that consumers cannot condition their decisions on their local social neighbor-
hood and the monopolist is not able to base his choice upon individual characteristics of consumers.
Our game is played in two periods and it is solved by backward induction. Each time period, in itself,
is a sequential game in which the monopolist chooses first, and the consumers react. The timing of the
model is reported in Figure 3.1. In period 1 the monopolist sets a price p1, and the consumers, after
having observed it, decide whether to purchase the good. In the second period, the monopolist sets a
new price p2 and she introduces the reward b, while the first period buyers decide whether to buy the
good again and contact their friends. Given the total investment of old consumers, information about
the existence of the product may reach some potential new buyers, who in turn buy the product if their
reservation prices are su ciently high.
3.4 Results
We now proceed to solve our model by studying the decisions of the agents, from the last to the first,
and assuming that what happened before is taken as given.
4The choice of studying the case of fixed cost has been made in order to capture the idea that the emergence of online
social networks and the use of e-mails tend to make the di↵erence in the number of people contacted negligible in terms of
total cost.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the model.
Purchase decisions of uninformed consumers. In the last step, uninformed consumers may receive
the information through old buyers. We define ⇢ as the probability for an agent to receive the information
at least once. From the point of view of the single agent, ⇢ is function of the number k of social ties
and of the number of first period consumers that invest in the social network, which we define as DInv1 .
Indeed, the more friends one person has, the more likely it is that at least one of them decides to invest
and to speak with him about the product. Moreover, as the number of investors increases, the odds for
each single neighbor to be an investor are higher. The new second-period demand D22 is composed of the
fraction of newly-informed agents exhibiting reservation price ri > p. Given the degree distribution f(k)
and the probability of receiving the information ⇢(k,DInv1 ) we can derive the new expected demand in
the second period as:
E(D22) =  (1  p2)⇢¯n, (3.3)
where ⇢¯ =
n 1P
k=1
⇢(k,DInv1 )f(k) represents the average probability of receiving the information about the
existence of the product and then ⇢¯n is the total expected number of receivers in the population.
The probability of receiving the information for each k can be easily specified by analyzing the
uninformed agent with degree k. In expected terms, the probability of receiving the information from
each single friend turns out to be equal to the share of investors in the total population D
inv
1
n . Thus, the
probability of receiving the information from at least one among k friends is:
⇢(k,Dinv1 ) = 1 

1  D
inv
1
n
 k
. (3.4)
Summing the expression in Equation (3.4) over all ks, we find explicitly ⇢¯. This can be plugged in
Equation (3.3), obtaining the expected number of new consumers buying the product in period 2. The
average spread of information and the expected competition will depend on the incentive to speak of
informed agents.
Investment decisions of old buyers. After having observed the second-period price and the reward
o↵ered by the monopolist, old buyers decide upon purchase, confronting the new price with their reserva-
tion value. Moreover, they take a decision about the investment in their social network, considering the
expected purchase behavior of the agents they inform. The two alternatives are either to bear a cost and
inform their friends (thus possibly getting rewards) or to give up the benefit, enjoying no extra utility.
The expected utility of an agent i with connectivity ki is thus defined as follows.
EU(ki) =
8><>:
 b(p2, , DInv1 )kib  C if i invests
0 if i does not invests.
(3.5)
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According to Equation (3.5), each agent invests if the amount she expects to receive is bigger than
the cost C. While the cost of activating the social network is assumed to be fixed, the expected benefit
requires a more precise analysis. Indeed, this amount is composed of three elements.  b is the probability
of getting a bonus for each person contacted. As it will be discussed in the next paragraph, the odds
depends on the social contact being a potential buyer and referring i as the source of information. Clearly,
a higher number of investors DInv1 implies a lower likelihood to be indicated as the recommender, as the
competition for each single bonus becomes stronger. In order to obtain the total expected benefit,  b is
then multiplied by the agent connectivity and the unitary bonus.
Given the presence of a fixed cost C, the actual investors will be those for which the expected benefits
are higher than C. Since this amount is monotonically increasing with the degree, there exists some k
such that all agents with ki   k will invest. Simply by equating benefits and cost, we find the critical
degree such that the net expected benefit from investing is exactly equal to 0 (the net utility obtained
by abstaining from investing).
Given this cuto↵ for investment, we can directly pin down the expected proportion of investors in the
population. In particular, among the informed agents, only the ones with k   k invest, i.e., a proportionP
k k f(k), bringing us to conclude D
Inv
1 = n(1    )(1   p1)
P
k k f(k). Accordingly, the probability
of getting a bonus can be represented by an increasing function of this cut-o↵ instead of a decreasing
function of the number of investors. Since the number of investors is monotonically decreasing in the
threshold k, the infra-marginal informed agent has degree k such that:
 b(p2, , k)k >  b(p2, , k)k >
C
b
(3.6)
As we will show in the analysis of the monopolist’s optimal decisions, the bonus will be set in such
a way that the least connected investors (k) are just willing to invest, i.e., they do not receive positive
utility. For this reason, we will consider hereafter the second (weak) inequality in (3.6) as an equality,
ruling out situations in which the infra-marginal investors receive a positive utility.
The interpretation of the cuto↵ is very straightforward. It will indeed depend on the individual
economic incentives to invest, which are clearly weaker for higher cost of investment and stronger when
the unitary bonus is higher. Assume a marginal increase in b or, equivalently, a fall in C. Since the LHS
in the inequalities in (3.6) is clearly increasing in k, than the threshold needs to adjusts to a lower level
to maintain the inequality above. 5
Competition among buyers and expected benefit. To explicitly find out what function  b is
composed of, consider an uninformed agent with degree kˆ, willing to buy at price p2. For given cuto↵ k
and corresponding number of investors DInv1 (k), the probability for this agent of receiving the information
x times is given by the probability of x among his friends to be informed investors,
⇣
DInv1 (k)
n
⌘x
. This
5For the sake of completeness, since the degree k is a discrete variable, if we consider the case in which infra-marginal
people are left with positive even small utility, k may not vary if the changes are not strong enough to make the cuto↵
move. All the results remain intuitively unaltered, but we should speak about the cuto↵ non-increasing (non-decreasing)
instead of decreasing (increasing) in the variable in question.
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can be interpreted as the likelihood for a given informed friend to have x  1 competitors when speaking
with him. Thus, in expected terms, for the single uninformed agent with connectivity kˆ it holds that:
kˆX
x=2
✓
DInv1 (k)
n
◆x
(x  1)
is the expected number of competitors from the point of view of an informed agent speaking with him.
Since agents do not know the specific characteristics of their friends (degree, information and willingness
to buy), they also have expectations according to the corresponding distributions. Thus the function
 b(p2, , DInv1 ) can be defined as follows:
 b(p2, , k) =
n 1X
k=1
f(k)
26664  (1  p2)
1 +
kˆP
x=1
⇣
DInv1 (k)
n
⌘x
(x  1)
37775
Unsurprisingly, an increase in   or a decrease in p2 result in a higher number of bonuses making the
inequality (3.6) more likely to be satisfied for all degrees. These variations will induce higher incentives
to investments pushing downward the corresponding cuto↵ k. On the other hand,  b is decreasing in k,
as to higher cuto↵ corresponds a lower share of investors and, thus, of competitors for the single bonus.
This entails clear e↵ects on the expected number of bonuses each informed individual expects to get.
These e↵ects are di↵erent among degrees. Assume that some variable a↵ecting the individual incentive
changes in such a way that the cuto↵ increases from k to k0 = k + 1. This in turns would imply the
expected number of competitors to drop and consequently the probability to increase from  b(k) to  b(k
0).
We can divide informed individuals into three categories. Agents with a degree higher than k would enjoy
a greater expected benefit from communication as competition is less intense. Conversely, agents with
degree strictly below k would find it even less profitable to invest if the cuto↵ is k0. Agents belonging
to one of these two categories would confirm a fortiori their decision when moving to a higher cuto↵ for
investment, albeit for exactly opposite reasons. The only people that would change their decisions are the
infra-marginal with degree k, who are just willing to invest when the cuto↵ is k but they would receive a
negative utility from investing once we move to a greater cuto↵. With all these considerations in mind,
we can summarize the results concerning consumer interactions and their economic consequences in the
following proposition.
Proposition 11. The function ⇢¯ is decreasing in C, p1, p2 and increasing in b. The opposite is true for
 b. Moving from   to a higher  0 has an ambiguous e↵ect, depending on the balance between the increase
of individual incentives (1   0)f(k   1) and the fall of the share of potential investors ( 0    ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 11 has a very intuitive interpretation. The share of investors in the population of buyers
determines how much information about the product is available in the second period as well as how
strongly old consumers are competing for each single bonus. In particular, the more people invest the
more information and competition there are. In turn, the number of investors depends on the incentives to
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communicate as well as on the total number of agents who are eligible to receive a bonus (i.e., first-period
buyers). Incentives are negatively and directly a↵ected by the cost of the investment, and negatively and
indirectly by the second-period price. Indeed, an increase p2 reduces the likelihood for a friend to buy
the product. The bonus is instead the tool the monopolist uses to stimulate communication, so a rise in
b results in an increased investment.
Unlike the second-period price, the first-period price does not a↵ect the incentives but the number of
potential investors. Indeed, charging a higher price in the first period lessens the number of first-period
buyers, with the consequence of a fall in the number of investors in the second period, keeping incentives
for each of them unchanged. For this reason, a higher p1 implies a decrease in the number of investors
and consequently ⇢¯ decreases and  b increases.
Varying instead the share of uninformed agents   entails both e↵ects on the number of potential
investors and on their communication incentives. From the point of view of the single informed agent,
who decides whether to speak or not, a higher   results in an increased likelihood of speaking with
an uninformed friend, so that incentives to communicate are higher. However, the number of potential
investors is obviously lower, with a consequent negative e↵ect on the actual number of investors. If the
first e↵ect prevails, the number of investors increases, involving a higher di↵usion of information but a
lower probability of obtaining the bonus for each investing person. The opposite is true otherwise.
The results shown in Proposition 11 are important in order to understand how the second-period
expected demand reacts to changes in bonus, prices, cost of investment and proportion of uninformed
consumers.
Lemma 2. The demand faced by the monopolist in the second period is increasing with the unitary reward
b, decreasing with both prices p1 and p2 and decreasing with the cost of investing in the social network.
The e↵ect of the proportion of uninformed consumers is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix.
Second period demand is composed by two parts, D12 and D
2
2. The first one, coming from early-
informed consumers, reacts only to changes in the second period price whereas the second one, coming
from newly-informed people, can be split into two di↵erent components. The first component is the
potential new market created by the bonus, which depends on the amount of information circulating
thanks to the second-period word-of-mouth communication, and also on the proportion of uninformed
people. The second component concerns the actual response in terms of purchase at price p2 of this
potential market.
Second-period price and bonus setting. At the beginning of the second period, the monopolist
sets the bonus and the second-period price in order to maximise expected profits. In particular, the
monopolist anticipates investment decisions of old buyers who are stimulated by the bonus and purchase
decisions of newly informed consumers, whose choice depends on the price they are asked to pay. Formally,
the monopolist solves the following maximisation problem:
max
p2,b
(p2   b)E(D22(k)) + p2D12(p2), (3.7)
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subject to the investment condition defined in inequality (3.6). Intuitively, the problem of the monopolist
is the following. A rise in the price increases per-consumer margins, but reduces the number of individuals
willing to buy the product. This is the well-known trade-o↵ of a price setting monopolist. Peculiarly, the
introduction of the referral reward entails another, di↵erent, trade-o↵. Indeed, the bonus represents an
additional cost but has the role of creating new demand by inducing referrals. On the one hand, a higher
bonus clearly reduces the margins that the monopolist can attain on the single new buyer as it works as
a cost: for each new buyer, the monopolist gives an amount b to one old buyer. On the other hand, the
dimension of the unitary reward has a positive e↵ect on the demand for the good, as it helps reducing
the informational problem. The solution to this trade-o↵ is summarized in Proposition 12.
Proposition 12. The maximisation problem in Equation (3.7) is solved by setting the price p⇤2 =
1
2 and
b⇤ = 2C  b(k⇤)k⇤ , where k
⇤ is the argmax of the following maximisation problem:
max
k

 
4
  C
 b(k)k
 
n⇢¯(k). (3.8)
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 12 is crucially linked to the number of old consumers
the monopolist finds optimal to induce to invest in their social network. Let us assume the monopolist
decides to target k, i.e., that she finds optimal to attract all old buyers with degrees at least equal to this
cuto↵. To reach the desired level of investment (and thus information), the monopolist sets the price for
new consumers p2 and the bonus b. In particular, since the bonus represents a cost for the monopolist,
it is always optimal to choose the smallest b compatible with having a given level of investment and, for
a given cuto↵, the price turns out to be equal to 1/2. Once the profit is maximised for each possible
cuto↵ k, then the monopolist’s choice trivially falls on the cuto↵ k⇤ resulting in the highest profit. This
optimal cuto↵ balances two di↵erent e↵ects that derive from the results of Proposition 11. Indeed, a
higher cuto↵ results in higher margins but smaller demand. The first result derives from the fact that
generating a higher k requires a smaller bonus and, since the price is always 1/2, the second-period
per-consumer margin is clearly more elevated. However, a higher cuto↵ also means less information for
early uninformed people, with the consequent squeeze on the demand.
In order to understand the conditions under which the program is optimal to be run, a natural
corollary of Proposition 12 is:
Corollary 8. When the informational problem is not su ciently strong (small  ) or the cost of the
investment in the social networks is too high (large C), the bonus program is not run. Otherwise the
program is run with b > 0.
Proof. Assume that    4C b(k)k or C  
  b(k)k
4 for all ks. Then, from the maximisation problem
in Equation (3.8), the monopolist cannot find any k compatible with obtaining positive second period
profits.
What this corollary expresses is simply that the program is optimal to be run, except for very specific
cases in which it would generate negative profits. This would be the case when either the informational
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problem is not severe enough or the cost of spreading the information is too high. Indeed, in the first
case, the program is not worth implementing because the potential new demand is very small. When
  approaches the limit of 0, the potential new demand to be reached thanks to the referral program
disappears. On the other hand, the cost influences the incentives of informed people. If this is very high,
then it can be the case that the bonus required to incentivize the word-of-mouth communication is so
high that the program would lead to negative per-consumer margins.
Given the di↵usion of online social networks and of ICT (which reduces investment costs) and the
presence of a large variety of new products on many markets (which makes the informational problems
more substantial), we expect the conditions of Corollary 8 to be unlikely to be met in the contemporary
world.
First-period purchase decisions. In the first period, the monopolist sets the price and the consumers
willing to buy at that price purchase. In particular, after having observed the price p1 charged by the
monopolist, agent i decides whether to buy the product. The utility that she enjoys is ui = ri   p1 if
the good is bought, and 0 otherwise. According to our informational assumptions, only a proportion
1     of the population is aware of the existence of the product and can then, in principle, buy it. Our
assumption that the reservation prices are uniformly distributed implies the probability of buying the
good to be equal to (1  p1). Accordingly, the total number of buyers at price p1 is:
E(D1(p1)) = (1   )(1  p1)n.
The remaining part of the population is composed of  n agents who are uninformed and (1   )np1 who
are informed but not interested in buying the product at price p1.
First-period price setting. Anticipating what will occur in the second period and having expectations
about the purchase decisions of the present period, the monopolist sets the price to maximise its inter-
temporal profits as defined in Equations (3.1) and (3.2):
⇡ = ⇡1 + ⇡2(b
⇤, k⇤) = n (1  p1) (1   )p1 +
"
 
4
  C
 ⇤b
 
DInv1 (p1)
 
k⇤
#
n⇢¯⇤
 
DInv1 (p1)
 
.
The optimal price p⇤1 follow from the balance between the margins vs. demand trade-o↵s of the first
period and of the second period. The first trade-o↵ is direct, as a higher price entails higher margins
but smaller demand from period one consumers. The second one is indirect, as a higher first period
price reduces the number of potential speakers, who are the means through which information about the
product circulates in the second. This reduction results in stronger individual incentives to speak, as there
is less potential competition for each bonus; consequently, the bonus needed to generate a given level of
information turns out to be lower, with an increase in margins. This is captured by function  ⇤b(D
Inv
1 (p1)).
However, at the same time, fewer potential investors also mean less circulation of information in the second
period, with a consequent reduction in second period demand represented by ⇢¯⇤(DInv1 (p1)). Formally,
the specific first period price follows from the first order condition of the maximisation of profit and will
depend on the second-period spread of information, which in turn is network-specific:
50
Pricing Based on Consumers’ Behaviour and Interconnections
p⇤1 =
1
2
 
P
k k⇤
f(k)
2
24✓ 
4
  C
 ⇤bk
⇤
◆
@⇢¯⇤
@DInv1
  ⇢¯⇤
C @ 
⇤
b
@DInv1
( ⇤bk
⇤)2
35 .
By simple comparisons of prices, the following proposition gives some results concerning how prices
change over time in our setting and compares our prices with a benchmark case of no reward.
Proposition 13. The second-period price p⇤2 is always higher than the price paid by earlier consumers
p⇤1. Moreover, early-informed consumers pay in the first period a price lower than the one that would be
paid without the introduction of the bonus. The presence of the bonus does not change the second-period
price.
Proof. Increasing Prices. Assume that the bonus is introduced. As stated in Corollary 8, this requires
that the monopolist realizes positive profits for some k and more specifically for k⇤. Thus, C and   must
be such that  4   C ⇤bk⇤ > 0. Since
@⇢¯⇤
@DInv1
> 0 and @ 
⇤
b
@DInv1
< 0, p⇤1 has the highest bound at 1/2 = p⇤2.
Comparisons with the no-bonus regime. Assume the case in which the reward is not introduced. This
implies that only the first-period informed agents can be attracted and the maximisation problem reduces
to the choice of a price p that solves:
max
p
np(1   )(1  p),
which yields the optimal price again equal to 1/2.
Proposition 13 implies some remarkable e↵ects on the welfare of informed consumers. On the one hand,
they see their price increase from period one to period two. From the point of view of the monopolist this
increase in price works as a partial source to cover the expense in terms of bonuses to be paid. Moreover,
it creates among old buyers some transfers from agents obtaining few bonuses to those receiving many.
Indeed, only some informed consumers will obtain enough referral bonuses to cover the increase in price.
Typically, the final position (winner or loser) of one agent depends on his popularity in the consumer
network, as people with higher degrees expect to receive more bonuses.
Compared to the case in which no referral bonus program is run, all consumers are better o↵ as the
prices are never above the benchmark case. This price-setting behaviour should be read as follows. In the
first period, a lower-than-the-benchmark price is o↵ered so as to attract more potential investors in the
second period, sowing seeds for the development of the second-period market. Once a sizeable amount of
informed consumers buy the product, the monopolist can o↵er them the bonus, and the price comes back
to the one that would have been charged without the bonus, with the usual price equalizing marginal
revenue with marginal cost (0 in our case). Without bonus, the need for seeding in the first period is not
there, as consumers would only be buyers in the strict sense and not channels to enlarge demand.
3.5 Making Social Network Structure Explicit
The results drawn in the previous section are general, being valid for any conceivable structure of social
interactions. Generality, however, comes at the price of being unable to define explicitly the dynamics
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relative to the choice of the minimal connectivity cuto↵, which is simply defined as the one that maximises
profits once the other variables are set optimally.
Improving these results requires to make assumptions about the consumer’s social network and to
make the degree distribution f(k) explicit. This allows to perform a comparative analysis of results in
di↵erent setups, which clarifies the changing weights of the di↵erent incentives. Besides, some network
structures are more likely to be realistic than others as human social networks tend to have specific
topological characteristics. Thus studying specific classes of networks increases the empirical relevance
of our results.
In this section, we discuss precise numerical solutions of our model for specific classes of degree
distributions, typical of the theoretical literature on social networks. The first type is the random networks
(Erdo˝s and Re´nyi 1959; Gilbert). Following the construction mechanism of Gilbert these graphs are
characterised by a given number of nodes (n) and a given probability 0     1, which describes the
chance of each link between pairs of nodes to exist. Since   is assumed to be equal for each pair of nodes,
these networks are characterised by a binomial distribution of degrees, i.e., 81  k  n  1:
f(k) =
✓
n  1
k
◆
 k(1   )n 1 k, (3.9)
where  n approximates the characteristic degree nodes in the networks. In other terms,   can be con-
sidered as a measure of network density. While random networks with this type of distribution cannot
be considered as good fit for most empirical human networks, they constitute an established benchmark
upon which to discuss other topologies.
The second type of degree distribution we discuss characterises networks defined as scale-free due
to the tendency of the standard deviation of the degrees to diverge. This type of construction does fit
many of the characteristics of empirical social networks, in particular the observation that a lot of them
approximately follow a power law degree distribution (for specific examples see Ugander et al. 2011; Ebel
et al. 2002; Liljeros et al. 2001; Baraba´si et al. 2002; Yu and Van de Sompel 1965; Albert et al. 1999).
Formally, we study networks with:
f(k) =
1/k P
k2N
(1/n )
,
where 2     3 represents the slope of the power law. The boundaries for the slope follow from
the observation in Baraba´si and Albert (1999) that most empirically studied social networks have slopes
within these values. Two characteristics of this class of networks need to be emphasised to understand our
results. The first is that increasing the parameter   implies lowering the probabilities to observe highly
connected individuals, thus leading to sparser networks (see Figure 3.2 for a graphical exemplification).
The second is that this type of network reproduces the empirically observed fact that the probability of
having individuals that are much more connected than the population’s average is significantly higher
than what random networks would suggest.
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Figure 3.2: Two examples of scale-free networks with 400 agents and the p.d.f. from which the second one
is drawn (Right Panel). The network in the Left Panel is an example of a scale-free network with a slope
  = 2.2, while the one in the Central Panel with a slope   = 2.6.
3.5.1 Random networks
Random networks, with their bell-shaped degree distributions, represent a good benchmark upon which
to compare results obtained from other network topologies. In the following we discuss how our outcomes
depend on both network and non-network parameters of the model. On the one hand, as noted in the
previous section, the proportion of uniformed people in the initial population   has an impact on both the
incentives to invest (positive) and on the number of potential investors in the second period (negative).
Which of these two e↵ects dominates depends strongly on the degree distribution f(k) considered. On the
other hand, the cost of investing C a↵ects (negatively) only the personal incentives to di↵use information.
Thus, the sign of its e↵ect does not depend strictly on the structure of the social network (see Proposition
11). For this reason, we chose to fix the value of the latter parameter and to focus our attention on the
interaction between   and the network structure.
In Figure 3.3, we numerically solve the model for specific binomial degree distributions and we study
the results for each possible combination of the proportion of uninformed agents 0.05     0.95 (with
steps of 0.05) and of 0.05     1 (again, with steps of 0.05)6. To obtain the displayed results we fix
C = 0.002 and n = 400 and we compute the profit maximising threshold for investing k⇤ as well as the
optimal referral bonus b⇤ and first-period price p⇤1. This allows for obtaining a numerical comparative
statics of our model.
In the Left Panel of Figure 3.3 are reported the results concerning the optimal cuto↵. In other terms,
these results tell us where the infra-marginal agent (the one with just enough connections to invest given
the incentives) is positioned. It is immediately evident that in a random network the incentives are
such that only the most-connected half of the population is motivated to invest in his social networks,
regardless of the network density  . Correspondingly, increasing the density increases the targeted degree
and the first-period prices (Right Panel of Figure 3.3) and reduces the optimal bonus required (Central
Panel of Figure 3.3).
Concerning the impact of  , at any level of  , the optimal cuto↵ is decreasing with the proportion
6As discussed above  n approximates the characteristic degree of agents in the population. The degrees in the population
are centered around this value when considering a random network (Equation (3.9)).
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Figure 3.3: Numerical solution of the model using a random network of 400 individuals as f(k). Results
are reported for di↵erent combinations of the proportion of uninformed individuals   (vertical axis) and
of the probability of links between each pair of nodes to exist   (horizontal axis). Left Panel shows the
results concerning the optimal setting of the cuto↵ (k⇤), Central Panel shows the setting of the optimal
bonus awarded for each referral (b⇤), Right Panel shows the optimal value of the first period price p⇤1. In all
simulations C = 0.002.
of the uninformed. Indeed, when there are fewer informed agents, the monopolist needs to extend the
proportion of those who invest in communication. We know that she can do this by increasing b and/or
reducing p1. Figure 3.3, allows us to conclude that, in the presence of a significant informational problem,
the monopolist prefers to lower the first period price so as to extend the number of potential investors,
while the relative level of b⇤ is decreasing with  . In other words, in a random network, the lowered cuto↵
for high  ’s derives from decreased competition among the informed rather than from higher bonuses.
The choice of the monopolist to set incentives so that the cuto↵ is around the central value of the
binomial distribution can be explained in a relatively simple way. Profit maximisation results from
a trade-o↵ between reducing prices (or increasing bonuses), thus extending the new demand due to
information circulation, or doing the opposite, increasing margins made on a smaller group of consumers.
By setting the cuto↵ around the average degree in the population, she manages to have the information
di↵used by a large proportion of his current customers (approximately 1/2 of them) while still providing
contained bonus. Further e↵orts beyond this level would allow him to involve a decreasing additional
share of individuals at a progressively higher cost in terms of reduced margins.
The optimal bonus in random networks (Central Panel of Figure 3.3) is monotonically decreasing with
the network density and in the proportion of the uninformed. Indeed, the less consumers are connected
with each other, the smaller will be their expected benefit for each given level of b and thus the higher
the bonus demanded in equilibrium will be. Similarly, when increasing the proportion of the uninformed,
the optimal k⇤ changes only slightly, thus each investor will face fewer expected competitors and thus
will require lower bonus.
Finally, the Right Panel of Figure 3.3 shows that p⇤1 monotonically decreases in response to a more
pronounced network density and to a higher proportion of uninformed agents. The relationship with
the proportion of the uninformed follows from the need of the monopolist to create a su ciently large
population of buyers in the first period in order to sustain information di↵usion in the second period.
As the number of informed agents dwindles, the monopolist needs to capture more of them to run an
e↵ective referral program. Moreover, at any level of  , the sparser the network, the more di cult it
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Figure 3.4: Numerical solution of the model using scale-free networks of 400 individuals as a social network.
Results are reported for di↵erent combinations of the proportion of the uninformed   (vertical axis) and of
the slope of the power law   (horizontal axis). Left Panel shows the results concerning the optimal setting
of the cuto↵ (k⇤), Central Panel shows the setting of the optimal bonus awarded for each referral (b⇤), Right
panel shows the optimal value of the first-period price p⇤1. In all simulations C=0.002.
is to spread information. Therefore, the monopolist faces stronger incentives to extend the number of
potential investors, even at the cost of reducing his margins on informed buyers.
3.5.2 Scale-free networks
Let us now consider the more realistic power law degree distribution, characteristic of scale-free networks.
As before, we again propose a numerical solution of our model for all di↵erent combinations of power law’s
slopes 1.5     3 (in steps of 0.1)7 and of the proportion of the uninformed changing 0.05     0.95
(with steps of 0.05). For the di↵erent combinations of these two parameters, in Figure 3.4 we report
the results concerning the profit maximising threshold for investing k⇤ (Left Panel), the optimal referral
bonus b⇤ (Central Panel) and the first period price p⇤1 (Right Panel). All values are computed fixing
C = 0.002 and n = 400 with the aim to provide results comparable across parameter combinations.
The results in Figure 3.4 are quite di↵erent from those proposed in the previous subsection for random
networks. Indeed, for scale-free networks the optimal choice of the monopolist suddenly changes at a
certain level of   =  ¯( ), characterising a sharp transition in the monopolist’s decisions. At each level of
 , above the critical slope, incentives are set so that only the most connected consumers are induced to
communicate. Below  ¯( ), incentives are instead set so that many individuals are willing to invest and
di↵use information. Notably, the targeted degree experiences a big jump downwards and then responds
to variations of  , as increasing it reduces the competition among informed buyers. Fixing a low   (say
1.7) and progressively increasing  , the monopolist optimal o↵er will incentivise lower degree consumers,
since the bonus needed to induce their investment gets progressively lower.
The value of the optimal bonus (Central Panel of Figure 3.4) is very small above  ¯( ) as highly
connected individuals have very high incentives to invest both in terms of the expected benefits and in
terms of the lack of competition when they are the only ones targeted. Below the critical value of  ,
the bonus required is suddenly higher and increases in response to decreases in  , because competition
becomes tougher.
7No social networks are observed empirically having slopes 1.5    < 2. Therefore, we will focus our analysis on values
of   between 2 and 3.
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The relationship between   and the optimal first period price p⇤1 (Right Panel of Figure 3.4) is
consistent with the observations made for the random networks. The price is lower when fewer people are
aware of the existence of the monopolist’s product as the the latter attempts to maximise information
di↵usion. However, considering that network density is decreasing with   for scale-free networks, the
relationship between price and network density is reversed with respect to the random network case.
Indeed, fixing   and increasing   increases the optimal prices as the leverage e↵ect of the number of
potential investors becomes smaller. Once such leverage e↵ect becomes too small, the monopolist chooses
p⇤1 almost equal to 0.5 and focuses on maximising margins on current customers.
In order to understand the reasons for the abrupt change in the producer’s choice observed for the
scale-free networks and to generally characterise the monopolist’s choice in this setup, we need to focus
our attention on the area around the critical  ¯( ). In order to simplify the analysis, let us fix the
proportion of the uninformed to   = 0.5 and observe the optimal choice of k⇤ just before and just after
the phase transition. Figure 3.5 represents the profits that the monopolist obtains when it is selecting
decision variables so as to obtain a given k cuto↵ for his investment.
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Figure 3.5: Profit of the monopolist as the function of the chosen level of cuto↵ for the investment. The
blue line represents profits from the case in which   = 1.9 while the red dotted line represents the case in
which   = 2. In both cases   = 0.5, C = 0.002 and the size of the population n = 400.
The profits are always higher above the phase transition than below, regardless of the chosen cuto↵.
Furthermore, the di↵erence between the two values increases monotonically in the chosen cuto↵ becoming
maximal at k = n 1. Indeed, a larger   decreases the expected degree in the population and thus makes
the network sparser. Therefore, the competition decreases and targeting individuals of relatively higher
degrees requires less incentive and produces larger margins. Conversely, lowering   produces a denser
network that requires comparatively higher bonuses and lower margins on the new demand. However,
higher degrees in the network also imply that investing agents are more e↵ective in spreading information
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and in increasing the monopolist’s demand.
Therefore, above the phase transition the search for higher margins dominates. The monopolist prefers
to obtain high margins on his current clients and on a small additional demand, thus running a small
referral program (which involves only the most connected agents). The alternative would not be cost-
e↵ective since the gains in information di↵usion from the investment of agents with few connections are
small. Below the phase transition, the monopolist prefers instead to accept a reduction in his margins in
order to extend the demand as much as possible.
The sudden change in the optimal decision of the monopolist depends on the fact that, in a scale-
free network, the average individual does not characterise the typical number of social interactions in
the population due to the presence of agents with a much larger-than-average degree. Facing such a
distribution, the monopolist can only choose between running a limited (and cheap) referral program
centred on few, very popular agents, or motivating many of his clients to participate in order to maximise
demand.
3.6 Conclusion
We considered the strategies of a monopolist facing a partially uninformed population of consumers.
Having some knowledge about the social network that interconnects his current and potential clients
(limited to the distribution of the number of contacts in the population), she runs a referral program
o↵ering to his current customers bonuses in exchange for the introduction of new clients. These rewards
incentivise part of the current customer base in order to invest in communication, thus creating a flow of
information that generates new buyers and extends the demand of the monopolist.
From the point of view of the monopolist, introducing the referral program is convenient as long as
the informational problem that she faces is significant and as long as the cost of the investment is not
prohibitively high. These conditions for the optimality of the referral program tend to be more easily met
in contemporary markets. On the one hand, the di↵usion of ICT and of online social networks makes
di↵using information cheaper for consumers, both in terms of time and money. On the other hand, the
presence of a large multiplicity of goods and services and the frequent launch of new products imply
that companies frequently face significant informational problems. We thus expect referral programs to
become more extensively used in a large variety of markets in the future.
The introduction of the rewards in the second period has di↵erent e↵ects on the utility of di↵erent
agents. Earlier uninformed potential buyers who receive the information about the product are clearly
better o↵, since they can now buy a potentially valuable good. Informed consumers see prices increase
in the second period when the bonus is introduced, while only some of them obtain referral bonuses.
This means that some informed consumers are worse o↵ and some others are better o↵ in the second
period. Indeed, agents obtaining many bonuses are compensated for the increased price, while those
receiving fewer or no bonuses are not. The probability to be on each side of this division depends on
one’s popularity (the degree) in the consumer network.
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Comparing our results to the case in which no referral bonus program is run, it is clear that all
consumers are better o↵ as the prices are never above the benchmark case. This is a further testimony
of the power of referral marketing, which can thus be considered a very e↵ective way to solve significant
informational problems.
Referral bonus programs work by introducing incentives so that clients spread the information about
the existence of the company’s product to their social neighbours. Such incentives are clearly stronger
in the case of more central (or popular) individuals. This leads to the emergence of a minimal degree,
above which an agent invests and communicates with peers. The level at which this critical degree
settles depends strongly on the network structure. For this reason we analysed specific types of network
structures, that is, random and scale-free networks. In the first case, we showed that roughly the most-
connected half of informed consumers are incentivised to invest in equilibrium, regardless of the network
density. On the contrary, using the more realistic scale-free network topology, which fits better the
characteristics observed in empirical networks, the proportion of investing customers takes relatively more
extreme values. The monopolist faces a choice between two very di↵erent options: to maximise demand
by running an expensive referral program that induces many informed agents to invest, or to maximise
margins by running a very limited program that is only adopted by the most-connected individuals. His
choice depends essentially on how likely it is to observe agents with unusually high degrees. In many
empirically observed social networks, we expect the second option to be preferred.
Our results confirm that centrality matters when pricing is done in social networks as in Bloch and
Que´rou (2013). The main di↵erence is that, in our setup, the monopolist has only limited information
about the topology of the network while they assume that the producer is fully aware of all nodal
characteristics of each single agent. Moreover, the results we provide are very di↵erent. Bloch and
Que´rou (2013) find that central agents are charged more, unless consumption generates some positive
externality on other consumers. In our model being central is always advantageous as it allows to receive
”discounted” prices (due to the presence of the rewards).
While it is reasonable to assume that the reservation price and the degree are independent, one
could challenge our assumption in that the probability of being informed is independent of centrality and
reservation prices. For example, one could consider the case in which a more central node may have a
higher probability of being informed. However, the only channel through which an agent may become
informed is by receiving the information through its social network. The communication among agents
is indeed the core of this paper and captures the fact that highly-connected people who are initially
uninformed will be more likely to receive the information in the second period.
Studying the monopoly case is a necessary starting point in order to understand the e↵ects of limited
information about the consumer’s network on pricing. However, most markets where such programs
are run are, up to some degree, oligopolistic. Consequently, our current research endeavours focus on
extending this setup to an imperfect competition environment, where firms compete in terms of prices.
We expect that increasing the competitive pressure would push producers to o↵er higher rewards (thus
extending the share of consumers interested in activating their social network). In such models, the
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informational problem described here could be accompanied by a problem of switching costs, which
may induce producers to o↵er rewards to switchers as wells as to those who convince them to buy the
good. Referral bonuses are also relevant in the context of entry models. Here, the challenge would be
to understand the conditions under which the referral program is a way to prevent entrance for the
incumbent or a way to gain part of the market for the entrant.
Finally, a future line of research would be to understand how informational problems can be solved
using mixed marketing strategies involving both mass-media and the social network of consumers as
channels of informational spread. Specifically, the strategy based on social networks discussed in the
present paper can be seen both as an alternative and a complement to the one based on mass-media
advertisement, which o↵ers a uniform probability of reaching any potential customer.
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4Mathematical Appendices
4.1 Appendix of Chapter 1
4.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us analysis second period pricing decisions. Given the cuto↵s xˆH2 and xˆ
L
2 in equation (1.4) and (1.5),
firms solve the following problem in A’s turf:
max
pHH2
pHH2 xˆ
H
2 = p
HH
2
⇣
1
2 +
 +pLH2  pHH2
2
⌘
,
max
pLH2
pLH2
 
xˆ1   xˆH2
 
= pLH2
⇣
xˆ1   12    +p
LH
2  pHH2
2
⌘
.
Solving the maximization problem, firm H’s best response turns out to be:
pHH2 =
1 + + pLH2
2
,
and firm L best response is to set a price
pLH2 = xˆ1 +
pHH2   1  
2
.
which give the following equilibrium prices:
pHH2 =
 + 2xˆ1 + 1
3
and pLH2 =
4xˆ1   1  
3
.
Doing the same in L’s turf yields:
pHL2 =
 + 3  4xˆ1
3
and pLL2 =
3  2xˆ1   
3
.
Notice that charging a price pLH2 < 0 is a dominated strategy for firm L. Therefore, whenever the
equilibrium price pLH2 < 0 then the best option for this firm is to set p
LH
2 = 0. This will happen when
4xˆ1 1  
3  0, xˆ1   +14 .
When xˆ1   +14 it follows that pLH2 = 0 and thus the best response of firm H is to charge the maximal
possible price compatible with not to lose the marginal consumer located at xˆ1, i.e., a price pHH2 such
that qH   pHH2   xˆ1 = qL   0   (1   xˆ1), which gives pHH2 =   + 1   2xˆ1. This will give equilibrium
prices when xˆ1   +14 :
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pHH2 =  + 1  2xˆ1 and pLH2 = 0;
pHL2 =
 +(3 4xˆ1)
3 and p
LL
2 =
3 2xˆ1  
3 .
In this case switching is one direction towards firm H. Similarly, firm H will set pHL1 = 0 when
 +3 4xˆ1
3  0, xˆ1    +34 .
When xˆ1    +34 it follows that pLH2 = 0 and thus the best response of firm L is to charge the maximal
possible price compatible with not to lose the marginal consumer located at xˆ1, i.e., a price pLL1 such
that qH   0  xˆ1 = qL  pLL2   (1  xˆ1), which gives pLL2 = 2xˆ1  1  . This will give equilibrium prices
when xˆ1   +34 :
pHH2 =
 +2xˆ1+1
3 and p
LH
2 =
4xˆ1 1  
3 ;
pHL2 = 0 and p
LL
2 = 2xˆ1   1  .
Notice that if   > 1, this scenario with ODS to firm L cannot be reached unless. Summarizing, ODS
to L can be the case only if   < 1 or xˆ1 = 1.
4.1.2 Construction of the Best Replies.
Firm H best response.
(i) If xˆ1 =
1
2 +
 +pL1  pH1
2 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
, TDS occurs and firm H enjoys the following second pe-
riod profits: ⇡H2TDS =
 2+5(2xˆ21 2xˆ1+1) 2 (xˆ1 2)
9 . Accordingly, firm H solves maxpH1 ⇡
H
TDS =
maxpH1 p
H
1 xˆ1 +  ⇡
H
2TDS under the constraints
 +t
4t < xˆ1 <
 +3t
4t . The first order condition of
this problem gives:
pH1TDS =
(9  10 )
18  10  p
L
1 +
9
18  10  +
(9  8 ) 
18  10  ,
with correspondent xˆ1 =
9pL1  2 ( +5)+9( +1)
36 20  . If    1, then xˆ1 2 (0, 1) and constraints are met if
5  3  
9 ⌘ pˆHC < pL1 < pˆLC ⌘ 18 3   5 9 . The correspondent profit will be:
⇡HTDS =
(9pL1  9( +1))2 18pL1 (2 ( +5)) 4 2(3 +5)2+36 ( ( +2)+5)
72(9 5 ) .
We have three more cases to consider.
• When   > 1, the constraint xˆ1 <  +34 is non-binding. In this case, whenever pL1 is such that
xˆ1(pHTDS , p
L
1 )   1, i.e. pL1   pˆM ⌘ 2   10  9 +279 , TDS cannot occur tomorrow and firm H
becomes a monopolist setting the price pH1 such that xˆ = 1 or p
H
1M =  + p
L
1   1 and resulting
profit of ⇡HM =
1
18 ( + 3)
2 + + pL1   1, where the subscript M stays for monopoly of firm
H.
• If    1, the constraint xˆ1 <  +34 turns out to be binding when pL1   pˆLC , pH1 is such that
xˆ1 =
 +3
4 , or p
H
1LC =
 +2pL1  1
2 , leading to ODS to L. The profit overall will be:
⇡HLC =
1
72
 
18( + 3)pL1 +  (3 + 5)
2 + 9(   1)( + 3)  .
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• Finally, if pL1  pˆHC , then xˆ1   +14 . It means that pH1 is such that the constraint is binding,
i.e., pH1HC =
 +2pL1 +1
2 , , leading to ODS to L. The correspondent profit will be:
⇡HHC =
1
72
 
 (9 ( + 2) + 25) + 9( + 1)2 + 18( + 1)pL1
 
.
(ii) If xˆ1 =
1
2 +
 +pL1  pH1
2   +14 , ODS occurs only towards firm H, which receives profit ⇡H2H =
 2+(9 2xˆ1(10xˆ1+3))+2 (5xˆ1+3)
18 . The maximisation problem will be the following maxpH1 ⇡
H
H = maxpH1 p
H
1 xˆ1+
 ⇡H2H under the constraint xˆ1   +14 . The first order condition of this problem gives:
pH1H =
(10  + 9)
18 + 10 
pL1 +
9 + 13 
18 + 10 
+
 
2
,
with correspondent xˆ1 =
9pL1 +5   3 +9 +9
20 +36 . Constraint is met and xˆ1 2 (0, 1) if 0 < pL1 < pˆH ⌘
8 /9. The correspondent profit will be:
⇡HH =
1
8
✓
6 (5 pL1 )+9(pL1 +1)2+21 2
5 +9 + 2 
 
pL1 +   + 1
 
+ (  + 1) 2
◆
.
If pL1 < pˆH , xˆ1    +14 and thus firm H sets a price such that xˆ1 =  +14 , i.e., pH1HC . Moreover, since
⇡H2H(xˆ1 =
 +1
4 ) = ⇡
H
2TDS(xˆ1 =
 +1
4 ), this profit turns out to be ⇡HC .
(iii) If xˆ1 =
1
2 +
 +pL1  pH1
2    +34 , ODS occurs only towards firm L. This case can exist only if    t or,
when   > t, if xˆ1 = 1. ODS to L would give firm H a second period profit of ⇡H2L =
( +2txˆ1+1)
2
18t .
• If    1, then firm H solves maxpH1 ⇡HL = maxpH1 pH1 xˆ1+  ⇡H2L under the constraint xˆ1    +34 .
The first order condition of this problem gives:
pH1L =
(9  2 )
18  2  p
L
1 +
9  4 
18  2  +
(9  4 ) 
18  2  ,
with correspondent xˆ1 =
9pL1 +(2 +9)( +1)
4(9  ) . The constraint is met if p
L
1   18 3   5 9 , for other
prices ODL cannot occur. The resulting profit will be:
⇡HL =
(8  + 9)( + 1)2 + 9(pL1 )
2 + 2(2  + 9)( + 1)pL1
8(9   ) .
If pL1  pˆLC , xˆ1   +34 and thus firm H sets a price such that xˆ1 =  +14 , i.e., pL1LC . Moreover,
since ⇡H2L(xˆ1 =
 +3
4 ) = ⇡
H
2TDS(xˆ1 =
 +3
4 ), this profit turns out to be ⇡
H
LC . The case in which
xˆ1 = 1 has been already discussed in the TDS case.
Up to now, we obtained all possible best responses of firm H within each regime. In order to build
up the global best response, we must compare profits across regimes in each segment. We have three
possible cases:
1. If   < 1, then we have the following segments:
(a) pL1  pˆHC . =) best response pH1H .
(b) pL1 2 (pˆHC , pˆH) If pL1 >
p
(9 +9)2 (5  +5 )2
30 +
65  15  
90   3  310 ⌘ pˆ, then ⇡HTDS > ⇡HH .
Otherwise, ⇡HH > ⇡
H
TDS .
63
Pricing Based on Consumers’ Behaviour and Interconnections
(c) pL1 2 [pˆH , pˆLC). =) best response pH1TDS .
(d) pL1   pˆLC . =) best response pH1L.
2.   2 [1, 3  12 9 2  ], then pˆH < pˆM . In segments (a) and (b) nothing changes. Above pˆH we have:
(c.i) pL1 2 [pˆH , pˆM ]. =) best response pH1TDS .
(d.i) pL1   pˆM . =) best response pH1M .
3. If   > 3   12 9 2  then pˆM > pˆHIn segments (a) nothing changes compared to point 1. Above pˆHC
we have:
(b.ii) pL1 2 (pˆHC , pˆM ) . If   < 3  12(
p
81 25 2 (9 2 ))
36 29  ⌘  ˆ, then ⇡HTDS > ⇡HH for pL1 > pˆ =) best
response pH1TDS . Otherwise, the best response is always p
H
1H .
(c.ii) pL1 2 [pˆM , pˆH ]. ⇡HH > ⇡HM =) best response pH1H .
(d.ii) pL1   pˆH . ⇡HM > ⇡HHC =) best response pH1M .
Putting together all the results above, the best response will depend on the size of  . Indeed, the
best response of firm H will be the following:
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 (pˆ, pˆLC) ,
pH1L if p
L
1   pˆLC ,
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 [pˆ, pˆM ] ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆM ,
when   < 1, when   2 [1, 3  12 9 2  ],
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8>>><>>>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 [pˆ, pˆM ] ,
pH1H if p
L
1 2 [pˆM , pˆH ] ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆH ,
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
(
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆH ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆH ,
when   2 [3  12 9 2  ,  ˆ], when   >  ˆ.
Notice that 3  12 9 2  <  ˆ for any discount factor.
Firm L best response.
(i) If xˆ1 =
1
2 +
 +pL1  pH1
2 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
, TDS occurs and firm L enjoys a second period profit of
⇡L2TDS =
 2+5(2xˆ21 2xˆ1+1) 2 (xˆ1+1)
9 . Accordingly, firm L solves maxpL1 ⇡
L
TDS = maxpL1 p
L
1 (1  xˆ1) +
 ⇡L2TDS under the constraints
 +1
4 < xˆ1 <
 +3
4 . The first order condition of this problem gives:
pL1TDS =
(9  10 )
18  10  p
H
1 +
9
18  10   
(9  8 ) 
18  10  ,
with resulting xˆ1 =
9( +3) 9pH1  2 ( +5)
4(9 5 ) . If    1, then constraints are met if 3  +5 9 ⌘ p˜LC <
pH1 < p˜HC ⌘ 3   5 +189 . The correspondent profit will be:
⇡LTDS =
(9pH1  9(  1))2+18pH1 (2 (  5)+4 2(5 3 )2+36 ((  2)  5)
72(9 5 ) .
We have three more cases to consider.
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• If   > 1 the constraint xˆ1 <  +34 is non-binding. Whenever pH1 < p˜M , xˆ1   1 firm L cannot
enter the market.
• If pH1   p˜HC , then first constraint is not satisfied and thus pL1 will be such that xˆ1 =  +14 or
equivalently pL1HC =
2pH1  1  
2 . In this case the profit will be:
⇡LHC =
1
72
 
 (5  3 )2 + 9(   3)( + 1)  18(   3)pH1
 
.
• When    1 and pH1  p˜LC , then the second constraint is not satisfied and thus pL1 will be
such that xˆ1 =
 +3
4 or equivalently p
L
1LC =
2pH1 +1  
2 . The correspondent profit will be:
⇡LLC =
1
72
 
9(  + 1) 2 + 25    18 (  + pH1 + 1) + 18pH1 + 9
 
.
(ii) If xˆ1 =
1
2+
 +pL1  pH1
2   +14 , ODS occurs only towards firm H and firm L gets ⇡L2H = ( +(2xˆ1 3))
2
18 .
The maximisation problem will be maxpL1 ⇡
L
H = maxpL1 p
L
1 (1   xˆ1) +  ⇡L2H under the constraint
xˆ1   +14 . The first order condition of this problem gives:
pL1H =
(9  2 )
18  2  p
H
1 +
9  4 
18  2   
(9  4 ) 
18  2  ,
with correspondent xˆ1 =
2   6 +9  9pH1 +27
36 4  . Constraint is met if p
H
1   pˆHC and the correspondent
profit will be:
⇡LH =
(8  + 9)(   1)2 + 9(pH1 )2   2(2  + 9)(   1)pH1
8(9   ) .
If pH1  pˆHC , then xˆ1    +14 and thus firm L sets a price such that xˆ1 =  +14 , i.e., pH1HC . Moreover,
since ⇡L2H(xˆ1 =
 +1
4 ) = ⇡
L
2TDS(xˆ1 =
 +1
4 ), the profit will be ⇡
L
HC .
(iii) If xˆ1 =
1
2 +
 +pL1  pH1
2    +34 , ODS occurs only towards firm L. This case can exist only if
  < 1 or, when   > 1, if xˆ1 = 1. ODS to L would give firm L a second period profit of
⇡L2L =
 2+(46xˆ1 20xˆ21 17)+2 (5xˆ1 8)
18 .
If   < 1, then firm L maximizes maxpL1 ⇡
L
L = maxpL1 p
L
1 (1   xˆ1) +  ⇡L2L under the constraint
xˆ1    +34 . The first order condition of this problem gives:
pL1L =
(10  + 9)
18 + 10 
pH1 +
9 + 13 
18 + 10 
   
2
,
with correspondent xˆ1 =
27 9pH1 +5  +23 +9 
20 +36 . Constraint is met if p
H
1  p˜L ⌘ 8 9 and the corre-
spondent profit will be:
⇡LL =
1
8
✓
21 2 + 6 (5  pH1 ) + 9(pH1 + 1)2
5  + 9
+ (  + 1) 2   2 (  + pH1 + 1)
◆
.
If the constraint is not satisfied (i.e., pH1   p˜L ), then we are back to the case with price pL1LC and
profit ⇡LLC . If instead xˆ1 = 1, firm L entry is prevented.
Up to now, we obtained all possible best responses of firm L within each regime. In order to build up
the global best response, we must compare profits across regimes in each segment. We have two cases:
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1. If    1, then p˜L   p˜LC . We will have four segments:
(a) pH1 < p˜LC ⇡
L
L > ⇡
L
L =) pL1L
(b) pH1 2 (p˜LC , p˜L). If pH1 <
p 25 2 2+50 2  25 2+81 2 162 +81
30 +
15  +65 +27  27
90 ⌘ p˜, then
⇡LL > ⇡
L
TDS . When p
H
1 > pˆ =) ⇡LTDS > ⇡L1L.
(c) pH1 2 (p˜L, p˜HC). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LL =) pL1TDS .
(d) pH1   p˜HC . ⇡LH > ⇡LHC =) pL1H .
2.     1, then in the last segment nothing changes compared to the case with   < 1. For pH1  p˜HC
(a.i) pH1 < p˜M . Firm L is out of the market.
(b.i) pH1 2 (p˜M , p˜HC). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LL =) pL1TDS .
Putting together all the results above, the best response of firm L is
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
8><>:
pL1L if p
H
1  p˜,
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 [pˆ, p˜HC ] ,
pL1H if p
H
1 > p˜HC ,
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
(
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 (p˜M , p˜HC) ,
pL1H if p
H
1 > p˜HC ,
  < 1,     1.
4.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibria. We have three cases.
• TDS scenario. The only couple of prices generating this scenario is
(pH⇤1TDS, p
L⇤
1TDS) =
⇣
1 +  
3
  4  
81 60  ,1   3 + 4  81 60 
⌘
. This is an equilibrium whenever
  < 3  8 
9 4  ⌘  ¯. If      ¯, then the market splitting cut-o↵ will be located above 1, so that
TDS cannot be the case in the second period.
• ODS to H scenario. The only couple of prices is:
(pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) =
⇣
1 +  3 +
2 (22+11(1  )+ (1+5 )
24 +81 , 1   3 +  (15(1  )+11 +(10  7) )24 +81
⌘
.
From this situation, firm L would never deviate provided that  > 3  8 9 6  since pH⇤1H > p˜HC . On the
other hand, firm H does not deviate ( i.e., pL1H 2 [pˆM , pˆA]) whenever  > 3 min
n
8 
9 6  ,
28 (2 +9)
 (14 +27)+162
o
⌘
 . Summarizing, if     , this is always an equilibrium.
• ODS to L scenario. Two cases:
1. When   < 1, only one couple of prices can lead to this scenario, i.e.,
(pH1L, p
L
1L) =
⇣
27( +3)  (10  +22 +3  39)
24 +81 ,
 2 (5  +11 +3  45)+27(3  )
24 +81
⌘
.
This cannot be an equilibrium because the best response of firm H to pL1L is p
H
1TDS .
2. If     1, the only possibility is to have a monopoly of firm H in the first period, choosing
price pH1M = p
L
1 +   1. This strategy is e↵ective (i.e., firm L cannot enter the market) only
if pL1 +   1 < p˜M = 10 +9  2   99 , pL1 < 10  2  9 . Firm H always deviates to ODS when
  > 97 because
10  2  
9 <
8 
9 = pˆH and when  <
9
7 because
10  2  
9 <
27+2   10  9 
9 = pˆM .
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4.1.4 Case of forward-looking consumers
When consumers are forward-looking, they take into account the possibility of tomorrow’s switching. H
forward looking consumer buys good i today and potentially switches to firm j enjoying a discount price.
This will give him utility U i(x) = qi   pi1   |x  li|+  (qj   pij2   |x  lj |).
Firm H best response.
(i) If xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
. Compared to the case of myopia, the rational consumer who is indi↵erent in
period 1 anticipates that if she buys product H in period 1, she will switch to product L in period
2, whereas if she chooses product L in period 1 she will switch to product H in period 2. Thus, the
indi↵erent consumer is located in the xˆ1 such that
qH   pH1   xˆ1 +  
⇥
qL   pLH2   (1  xˆ1)
⇤
= qL   pL1   (1  xˆ1) +  (qH   pHL2   xˆ1)
where pLH2 and p
HL
2 are the ones in point (ii) of proposition 1. Rewriting:
xˆ1 =
1
2
+
(3   ) + 3(pL1   pH1 )    
2  + 6
. (4.1)
Following the same notation used in the construction of best replies of the case of myopic consumers,
we find the following:
Prices
pH1TDS =
(9 7 )pL1 +( (3  8)+9) +( +3)2
18 4  , p
H
1M =  + p
L
1   1   ( +1)3 ,
pH1LC =
 3    +3 +6pL1  3
6 , p
H
1HC =
 3  + +3 +6pL1 +3
6 .
Profits
⇡HTDS =
9(3pL1    + +3 +3)2+12 (3 ( ( +4)+ +2)+5( +3) 3( +5)pL1 ) 4 2(3 +5)2
72(9 2 ) ,
⇡HLC =
18( +1)pL1 +4 (3 +7)+9( +1)
2
72 , ⇡
H
HC =
18( +3)pL1 +16 +9(  1)( +3)
72 ,
⇡HM = p
L
1 + (   1) + (  1)  +2 9 .
Cuto↵s
pˆHC =
 (3 +5)
9 , pˆLC ⌘ 3  + +189 .
(ii) If xˆ1   +14 , ODS occurs only towards firm H. Here, the rational consumer who is indi↵erent
in period 1 anticipates that if she buys product H in period 1, she will buy it again in period 2,
whereas if she chooses product L in period 1 she will switch to product H in period 2. Thus, the
indi↵erent consumer is located in the xˆ1 such that
qH   pH1   xˆ1 +  
⇥
qH   pHH2   xˆ1
⇤
= qL   pL1   (1  xˆ1) +  (qH   pHL2   xˆ1)
where pHH2 and p
HL
2 are the ones in point (ii) of proposition 1. Rearranging:
xˆ1 =  +
3(1 + pL1     pH1 )
2(3   ) .
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Using the same notation of the myopia case, we will have:
pH1H =
(7 +9)pL1   (3  + +4  10)+9( +1)
18+4  , pˆH =
 (3 +5)
9 ,
⇡HH =
9(pL1 )
2 2pL1 ( ( +3) 9( +1))+ 2( +3)2+2 ( +3)( +5)+9( +1)2
8(9+2 ) .
(iii) If xˆ1    +34 , ODS occurs only towards firm L. The rational consumer who is indi↵erent in period
1 anticipates that if she buys product L in period 1, she will buy it again in period 2, whereas if
she chooses product H in period 1 she will switch to product L in period 2. Thus, the indi↵erent
consumer is located in the xˆ1 such that
qH   pH1   xˆ1 +  
⇥
qL   pLH2   (1  xˆ1)
⇤
= qL   pL1   (1  xˆ1) +  
⇥
qL   pLL2   (1  xˆ1)
⇤
,
where pLH2 and p
LL
2 are the ones in point (ii) of Proposition 1. Rearranging:
xˆ1 =  + 1  3
 
pH1   pL1 + + 1
 
2 (3   ) .
Using the same notation of the myopia case, we will have:
pH1L =
(9 5 )pL1  (1  )(9 4 )( +1)
18 8  , ⇡
H
L =
2(9 4 )( +1)pL1 +9(pL1 )2+(9 4 )( +1)2
8(9 4 ) ,
pˆL = 2  8 9 .
Doing the same analysis done for the myopic consumers’ case, we can distinguish four possible cases.
1. If   < 1 , then we have the following segments:
(i) pL1  pˆH . ⇡HH > ⇡HLC ,⇡HHC =) best response pH1H .
(ii) pL1 2 (pˆH , pˆL). ⇡HTDS > ⇡HHC ,⇡HLC =) pH1TDS .
(iii) pL1 2 [pˆL, pˆLC ]. ⇡HTDS > ⇡HL if
pL1 < pˆ ⌘ 118
⇣
4 (3 + 5) + 3
⇣p
(2    9)(4    9)( + 3)2   9   15
⌘⌘
,
the opposite is true otherwise.
(iv) pL1 > pˆL. ⇡
H
L > ⇡
H
HC ,⇡
H
LC =) pH1L.
2. If 3 >   > 1 , then the best response remains unchanged in segment (i). For pL1   pˆH , we have the
following segments:
(ii) pL1 2 (pˆH , pˆM ). ⇡HTDS > ⇡HHC =) pH1TDS .
(iii) pL1 > pˆM . ⇡
H
M > ⇡
H
HC =) pH1MH .
Putting together all the results above, the best response will depend on the size of  . Namely, the
best response of firm H will be:
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆH ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 (pˆH , pˆ),
pH1L if p
L
1   pˆ,
pH1 (p
L
1 ) =
8><>:
pH1H if p
L
1  pˆH ,
pH1TDS if p
L
1 2 [pˆH , pˆM ] ,
pH1M if p
L
1 > pˆM ,
when   < 1, when   2 [1, 3].
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Firm L best response.
(i) If xˆ1 2
 
 +1
4 ,
 +3
4
 
. Doing the same as done for the high-quality firm and using the same notation
of the case of myopic consumers, we find:
Prices
pL1TDS =
(9 7 )pH1  (9  (8 3 )) +( +3)2
18 4  , p
L
1M =  + p
L
1   1   ( +1)3 ,
pL1LC =
 3    +3 +6pL1  3
6 , p
L
1HC =
 3  + +3 +6pL1 +3
6 .
Profits
⇡LTDS =
9(3pH1 +(  3) + +3)2+12 (3(  5)pH1 +3 ( (  4)+  2)+5( +3)) 4 2(5 3 )2
72(9 2 ) ,
⇡LHC =
18(3  )pH1 +16  9(3  )( +1)
72 , ⇡
L
LC =
18(1  )pH1 +4 (7 3 )+9(1  )2
72 .
Cuto↵s
p˜LC =
 (5 3 )
9 , p˜HC =
18 3  + 
9 , p˜M =  +
 (7 5 )
9   1.
(ii) If xˆ1   +14 , ODS occurs only towards firm H. Doing the same as done for the high-quality firm
and using the same notation of the case of myopic consumers, we find:
pL1H =
(9 5 )pH1 +(1  )(9 4 )(1  )
18 8  , p˜H = 2  8 9 , ⇡LH =
2(9 4 )(1  )pH1 +9(pH1 )2+(9 4 )(  1)2
8(9 4 ) .
(iii) If xˆ1    +34 , ODS occurs only towards firm L. Doing the same as done for the high-quality firm
and using the same notation of the case of myopic consumers, we find:
pL1L =
(7 +9)pH1 + ( (3  1)+4 +10) 9 +9
4 +18 , p˜L =
 (5 3 )
9 ,
⇡LL =
2pH1 ( (  3) 9 +9)+9(pH1 )2+ 2(  3)2+2 (  5)(  3)+9(  1)2
8(2 +9) .
We have two cases:
1. If    1, we will have four segments:
(a) pH1 < p˜LC . ⇡
L
L > ⇡
L
HC ,⇡
L
LC =) pL1L
(b) pH1 2 (p˜LC , p˜H). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LLC ,⇡LHC =) pL1TDS .
(c) pH1 2 (p˜H , p˜HC). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LH if
pH1 < p˜ ⌘ 118
⇣
3
⇣p
(2    9)(4    9)(   3)2 + 9   15
⌘
+ 4 (5  3 )
⌘
,
the opposite is true otherwise.
(d) pH1 > p˜HC . ⇡
L
H > ⇡
L
HC ,⇡
L
LC =) pL1H
2.     1, then
(a) pH1 < p˜M . Firm L is out of the market.
(b) pH1 2 (p˜M , p˜H). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LHC =) pL1TDS .
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(c) pH1 2 (p˜H , p˜HC). ⇡LTDS > ⇡LH if pH1 < p˜.
(d) pH1 > p˜HC . ⇡
L
H > ⇡
L
HC =) pL1H .
Putting together all the results above, the best response of firm L is
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
8><>:
pL1L if p
H
1  p˜LC ,
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 (p˜LC , p˜),
pL1H if p
H
1   p˜,
pL1 (p
H
1 ) =
(
pL1TDS if p
H
1 2 (p˜M , p˜),
pL1H = if p
H
1 > p˜,
when    1, when   > 1.
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibria. We have three cases.
• TDS scenario. The only couple of prices generating this scenario is
(pH⇤1TDS, p
L⇤
1TDS) =
⇣
1 +  
3
+  
3
  (13 9 )  
81 33  ,1   3 +  3 + (13 9 )  81 33 
⌘
.
When   < 1, both firms are on their best responses. If     1, then firm H always deviates if
  > 3  20 9+3  ⌘  ¯FL, since pL⇤1TDS < pˆH . For what concern firm L,   >  ¯FL implies pH⇤1TDS  p˜M .
Summarizing, This is an equilibrium i↵   <  ¯FL.
• ODS to H scenario. Given the best responses, the candidate equilibrium prices will be
(pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) =
⇣
1 +  
3
+ 4 (12 9  (5  ) )
3(27  ) ,1   3 +  (( +29)  21( +1))3(27  )
⌘
. When   < 1, this
is not an equilibrium. When   > 1, the monotonicity and continuity of firm H best response implies
that whenever TDS can be an equilibrium, ODS to H cannot. Therefore, a necessary condition for
ODS to H to be an equilibrium is that   >  ¯FL. From this situation, firm L would never deviate
when    9(2
p
103 19)
17 ⇡ 0.6871. Otherwise, it is needed the stricter condition that
  > 3  20 
⇣
9
⇣
3
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+227
⌘
  
⇣
4 +
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+1029
⌘⌘
3(1296  (279  ( +138))) ,
otherwise pH⇤1H > p˜. On the other hand, firm H does not deviate ( i.e., p
L⇤
1H < pˆH) whenever
  >  ¯FL. Therefore, if
    3 min
⇢
20 
9+3  ,
20 
⇣
9
⇣
3
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+227
⌘
  
⇣
4 +
p
(9 2 )(9 4 )+1029
⌘⌘
3(1296  (279  ( +138)))
 
⌘  FL,
this is always an equilibrium.
• ODS to L scenario. Two cases:
1. When   < 1, only one couple of prices can lead to this scenario, i.e.,
(pH1L, p
L
1L) =
⇣
27( +3  2( +21) 6 (5 +4))
3(27  ) ,
(9 4 )( ( +9) 3 +9)
3(27  )
⌘
. These prices cannot be an
equilibrium because pH⇤1L < pˆ.
2. If     1, the only possibility is to have a monopoly of firm H in the first period, choosing price
pH1MH = p
L
1 +     1. This strategy is e↵ective (i.e., firm L cannot enter the market) only if
pL1 +   1 <  2  +10 +9  99 , pL1 < 10  2  9 . Firm H always deviates when   > 97 because
10  2  
9 <
8 
9 (the minimal price charged by the rival to find profitable the monopoly case)
and when   < 97 because
10  2  
9 <
2   10  9 +27
9 .
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Market shares and Exit.
1. When (pH⇤1TDS , p
L⇤
1TDS) are the equilibrium prices, then xˆ1 =
1
2 +
(9 7 ) 
27 11  , xˆ
H
2 =
1
3 +
3(2  ) 
27 11  and
xˆL2 =
2
3 +
3(2  ) 
27 11  . In the second period xˆ1   xˆH2 = 16   ( +3) 54 22  consumers switch from H to L and
xˆL2   xˆ1 = 16 + ( +3) 54 22  move to the opposite direction.
2. When (pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H) are the equilibrium prices, then xˆ1 = xˆ
H
2 =
1
2 +
 (  14)+9 
2(27  ) , and xˆ
L
2 =
1
2 +
12 +9 5 
2(27  ) . In the second period, min
 
xˆL2   xˆ1, 1  xˆ1
 
consumers switch from L to A.
3. If   > max{ 2 +96 , FL}, then ODS to H determines the exit of the low quality firm from the
market.
The first two results are found by plugging the first-period equilibrium prices into the cuto↵s expressed
in equations (1.4), (1.5), (1.7) and (1.8). For the result in point 3., take the xˆL2 =
3(2( +3)  )
27   resulting
from (pH⇤1H , p
L⇤
1H). It holds that
3(2( +3)  )
27   > 1 ,   > 2 +96 . Since ODS-to-H equilibrium exists only if
  >  FL, the results above are proved.
4.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Under BBPD, three di↵erent cases may arise:
(a) Exit of the low-quality firm (  > 11 +185 +12 ). In this case, firm H and firm L respectively get:
⇡HE =
 3( (133  358)+789)+66 2( (8 +3)+27)+162 ( +3)(4 +5)+243( +3)2
6(8 +27)2 ,
⇡LE =
(81++39  22 2+(2  3)(5 +9) )( (25 7 )+9(3  ))
6(8 +27)2 .
It is easy to verify that ⇡HE   ⇡Hu and ⇡LE   ⇡Lu are both positive if   > 11 +185 +12 .
(b) ODS with the low-quality firm active. Since   < 11 +185 +12 only if   > 6/7, this case can exist only if
  > 6/7. Here firm H gets ⇡HH =
 3( (103  82)+327)+ 2(501 2+846 +729)+108 ( +3)(7 +6)+243( +3)2
6(8 +27)2 ,
which is higher than ⇡Hu if   <⇡ 0.978601. When the discount factor is very close to 1, it will be
higher only if
  >
9
7
  30(251  + 540)
7 (245  + 1007) + 7749
+ 30
s
(5  + 9)(8  + 27)2
( (245  + 1007) + 1107)2
,
lower otherwise. Since this case is very specific, we assume a discount factor reasonably lower than
0.978601.
On the other hand, firm L is always better o↵ under the discriminatory regime, as the profit it gets,
i.e.,
⇡LH =
 3( +17)(5  11)+3 2( (83  354)+523)+54 ( (11  52)+75)+243(  3)2
6(8 +27)2
is always higher that ⇡Lu .
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(c) TDS. In this case, both firms are strictly worse o↵ under the discriminatory regime. Indeed, the
profits they get:
⇡HTDS =
80 3(3 +5)2 72 2( (23 +60)+25)+81 ( (5  22) 75)+729( +3)2
18(27 20 )2 ,
⇡LTDS =
80 3(5 3 )2 72 2( (23  60)+25)+81 ( (5 +22) 75)+729(  3)2
18(27 20 )2 ,
are both lower than the respective profits resulting under the uniform pricing if
  <
60  81
p
(27 20 )2(16 (20  61)+765)
2(4 (20  61)+189) ⌘  ˜. Otherwise, the low-quality firm is better o↵ and the
high-quality worse o↵ under the discriminatory regime.
4.1.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The benchmark case. If BBPD is not viable, prices are equal in both periods and there is not
switching. By simple computation, the total surplus will be:
CSu =
x¯Z
0
UHH(x)dx+
1Z
x¯
ULL(x)dx = qH + qL   45  
2
18
,
where U iiu (x) = 2
 
qi   piu   |x  li|
 
represents the utility of buying in the two period good i paying the
non-discriminatory price.
Discriminatory Price. Under BBPD, three di↵erent cases may arise:
(a) Exit of the low-quality firm .
CSE =
xˆ1R
0
UHHH (x)dx+
1Rˆ
x1
UHLH (x)dx =
(24qH+30qL 2 2)
27   2,
where U ijH is simply the utility of buying good j in the first period and good i in the second when
prices are the one leading to a scenario in which only the high-quality firm poaches rival’s consumers.
Compared with CSu, this is always lower.
(b) ODS with the low-quality firm active. In this case, the total surplus will be:
CSH =
xˆ1R
0
UHHH (x)dx+
xˆL2Rˆ
x1
UHLH (x)dx+
1Rˆ
xL2
ULLH (x)dx
= 1486
 
582qL + 147qH   (16 + 81qH) 2   954  .
This is always lower than the benchmark case of uniform pricing.
(c) TDS. In this case, the total surplus will be:
CSTDS =
xˆH2R
0
UHHTDS(x)dx+
xˆ1Rˆ
xH2
ULHTDS(x)dx+
xˆL2Rˆ
x1
UHLTDS(x)dx+
1Rˆ
xL2
ULLTDS(x)dx
= 1225
⇣
243 2
27 20    1053 
2
(27 20 )2   2 + 225(qH + qL)  475
⌘
,
where U ij2TDS is simply the utilities of buying good j in the first period and good i in the second
when prices are the one leading to a two-direction switching. Compared with CSu, this is always
higher.
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4.1.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Under BBPD, three di↵erent cases may arise:
(a) Exit of the low-quality firm (  >). In this case, firm H and firm L respectively get:
⇡HE =
 3(13  )(87 7 ) 3 2(603+ (240 23 ))+81 ( +3)( +9)+243( +3)2
6(27  )2
⇡LE =
( (13  )+9(3  ))( ( +30)  3 (7 +8)+27(3  ))
6(27  )2 .
It is easy to verify that ⇡HE   ⇡Hu < 0 and ⇡LE   ⇡Lu > 0.
(b) ODS with the low-quality firm active. Here firm H gets
⇡HH =
 3( (7  166)+1023)+3 2( (11  126) 801)+189 ( +3)2+243( +3)2
6(  27)2 ,
which is always lower that ⇡Hu .
On the other hand, firm L is always better o↵ under the discriminatory regime, as the profit it gets,
i.e.,
⇡LH =
2 ( ( ( +16)+27) 2+3 (9 +59)  9 (19 +24)+486(  1))
9(  27)2
is always higher that ⇡Lu .
(c) TDS. In this case, both firms are strictly worse o↵ under the discriminatory regime. Indeed, the
profits they get:
⇡HTDS =
4 3(3 (12 +55)+242) 9 2( (55 +246)+407)+162 ((  2) +3)+729( +3)2
18(27 11 )2 ,
⇡LTDS =
4 3(3 (12  55)+242) 9 2( (55  246)+407)+162 ( ( +2)+3)+729(  3)2
18(27 11 )2 ,
are both lower than the respective profits resulting under the uniform pricing if
  < 3  (27 11 )
⇣
2
p
117  (37 8 ) 3(7  )
⌘
27  (23  22) ⌘  ˜FL. Otherwise, the low-quality firm is better o↵ and
the high-quality worse o↵ under the discriminatory regime.
4.1.8 Proof of Proposition 7
The benchmark case. If BBPD is not viable, prices are equal in both periods and there is not
switching. By simple computation, the total surplus will be:
CSFLu =
x¯Z
0
UHH(x)dx+
1Z
x¯
ULL(x)dx = (1 +  )
✓
qH + qL   45  
2
36
◆
,
where U iiu (x) = (1+ )
 
qi   piu   |x  li|
 
represents the utility of buying in the two period good i paying
the non-discriminatory price.
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Discriminatory Price. Under BBPD, three di↵erent cases may arise:
(a) Exit of the low-quality firm .
CSFLE =
xˆFL1HR
0
UHHH (x)dx+
1R
xˆFL1H
UHLH (x)dx =
81(18(qH+qL)+ 2 45)  2(98qH+114qL+23 2 1703)
4(27  )2
+
18 (70qH+7 2+80qB 174) 2 3(287 2qH 48qL+2 2)
4(27  )2
where U ijH is simply the utility of buying good j in the first period and good i in the second when
prices are the one leading to a scenario in which only the high-quality firm poaches rival’s consumers.
Compared with CSu, this is always higher.
(b) ODS with the low-quality firm active. In this case, the total surplus will be:
CSFLH =
xˆFL1HR
0
UHHH (x)dx+
xˆL2R
xˆFL1H
UHLH (x)dx+
1Rˆ
xL2
ULLH (x)dx
=
 2(1847 194qH 18qL 23 2)+18 (46qH+104qL+15 2 156) 2 3(279 2qH+2 2 48 )+81( 2 18  45)
4(27  )2 .
This is always higher than the benchmark case of uniform pricing.
(c) TDS. In this case, the total surplus will be:
CSTDS =
729((  18)  45)+ 3(243 2+2046qH+2310qL 5203) 9 2(89 2+954qH+938qL 2233)
36(27 11 )2 ,
+
81 (13 2+42qH+18qL 57)
36(27 11 )2
where U ij2TDS is simply the utilities of buying good j in the first period and good i in the second
when prices are the one leading to a two-direction switching. Compared with CSu, this is always
higher.
4.2 Appendix of Chapter 2
4.2.1 Proof of Proposition 8.
TDS. Expecting to lose some subscribers, platform j expects to keep njjS2 = |xj2   lj | of them. These
agents are going to pay the fee that platform j charges to its loyalists, i.e., pjjS2. On the other hand,
|xi2 xS1| are expected to switch from the rival platform i and these switchers are going to pay price pji2 .
Plugging these results into equation (2.6) and putting together with (2.5), all the cuto↵s depend on all
prices as follows:
xA2 =
1
2 +
↵S(pBF2 pAF2)
2 4↵F↵S +
(1 ↵F↵S)(pBAS2  pAAS2 )
2 4↵F↵S +
↵F↵S(pBBS2  pABS2 )
2 4↵F↵S +
↵F↵S(1 2xS1)
2 4↵F↵S ;
xB2 =
1
2 +
↵S(pBF2 pAF2)
2 4↵F↵S +
(1 ↵F↵S)(pBBS2  pABS2 )
2 4↵F↵S +
↵F↵S(pBAS2  pAAS2 )
2 4↵F↵S +
↵F↵S(1 2xS1)
2 4↵F↵S ;
xF2 =
1
2 +
pBF2 pAF2
2 4↵F↵S +
↵F (1 2xS1+pBAS2  pAAS2 +pBBS2  pABS2 )
2 4↵F↵S .
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In stage (2.1), anticipating the joining behaviour of both sides of the market, platform j solves the
following maximisation problem:
max
pjjS2,p
ji
S2,p
j
F2
(pjjS2   cS)|xj2   lj |+ (pjiS2   cS)|xi2   xS1|+ (pjF2   cF )|xjF2   lj |.
Using the first-order conditions of this problem and solving the system of best responses, the equilib-
rium prices are the following:
pAAS2 = cS +
5
12   ↵F + 12xS1 + ⇤, pBBS2 = cS + 512   ↵F + 12 (1  xS1)  ⇤,
pBAS2 = cS +
13
12   ↵F   32 (1  xS1)  ⇤, pABS2 = cS + 1312   ↵F   32xS1 + ⇤,
pAF2 = cF + 1  ↵S + ⌦, pBF2 = cF + 1  ↵S   ⌦.
Where ⇤ ⌘ 3(2xS1 1)(3 2↵S(2↵S+↵F ))4(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F )) and ⌦ ⌘
(↵S ↵F )(2xS1 1)
4(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F )) .
ODS Under this assumption, none among A’s first period subscribers switches platform, therefore firms
expect to meet xB2 agents in platform A and 1   xB2 in platform B. Plugging into equation (2.6) and
putting together with (2.5), the market splitting cuto↵s turn out to be the following:
xB2 =
1
2
+
(qBBS2   qABS2 ) + ↵S(qBF2   qAF2)
2(1  ↵S↵F ) ,
xA2 =
1
2
  ↵S
2
+
qBAS2   qAAS2
2
+
↵S↵F (qBBS2   qABS2 ) + ↵S(qBF2   qAF2)
2(1  ↵S↵F ) ,
xF2 =
1
2
+
↵F (qBBS2   qABS2 ) + (qBF2   qAF2)
2(1  ↵S↵F ) .
According to these expectations, platform A would keep all xS1 loyal subscribers, who are supposed
to pay qAAS2 . On the other hand, x
B
2   xS1 are expected to switch from the rival and are going to pay
price qABS2 . Accordingly, platform A solves the following problem:
max
qAAS2 ,q
AB
S2 ,q
A
F2
(qAAS2   cS)xS1 + (qABS2   cS)(xB2   xS1) + (qAF2   cF )xF2,
under the constraint that xA2   xS1. In turn, platform B only expects to keep 1 xB2 subscribers without
attracting any new of them, thus solving the following:
max
qBBS2 ,q
B
F2
(qBBS2   cS)(1  xB2 ) + (qBF2   cF )(1  xF2).
For what concerns the prices charged to inherited subscribers of platform B as well as to firms, the
solution of the systems of first order conditions yields the following equilibrium values:
qABS2 = cS + 1  (1 + )xS1   ↵F , qBBS2 = cS + 1  (1  )xS1   ↵F ,
qAF2 = cF + 1  ↵S + (2↵S    )xS1, qBF2 = cF + 1  ↵S +  xS1, (4.2)
where  ⌘ 3(1 ↵F↵S)9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F ) and   ⌘
2((4↵S ↵F )+↵2S(↵S+2↵F ))
9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F ) .
Di↵erent reasoning holds for inherited subscribers of A, who are assumed to be loyal in the second
period, making thus the platform A profit linearly increasing in qAAS2 . This means that platform A wants to
set the highest possible price to old subscribers compatible with the constraint. Moreover, at equilibrium
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the rival cannot find any profitable price undercut. In a two-sided market prices can be and, actually,
often are below marginal cost. Therefore, in the current analysis firm B should be allowed to undercut
the rival choosing a price in the latter’s turf qBAS1 even lower than the marginal cost cS . Nevertheless, in
line with Armstrong and Wright (2007), the set of possible prices is here restricted to the positive reals,
and thus the lowest price that can be charged is zero. Accordingly, the optimal qAAS2 will be the higher
possible given the constraint (namely, xA2 = xS1) and avoiding any possible price undercut from the rival
(qBAS2 = 0) which, rearranging terms, gives the following optimal price for A’s loyal subscribers:
qAAS2 = 1 + 2xS1
✓
↵S(↵F   ↵S)
9  (2↵S + ↵F )(↵S + 2↵F )   1
◆
. (4.3)
The prices described in equations (4.2) and (4.3) yield xA2 = xS1 and xB =
1
2 +
3xS1
9 (2↵S+↵F )(↵S+2↵F ) .
4.2.2 Proof of Lemma 6
For the prices in point 1 of Proposition 8 to be an equilibrium, platforms must expect TDS to occur.
To be consistent with these expectations, we need that xA2 < xS1 < x
B
2 . Given the equilibrium prices in
point 1 of Proposition 8, the two cuto↵s are:
xA2 =
1
12
+
xS1
2
+
9(1  2xS1)
12(9  2(2↵F + ↵S)(↵F + 2↵S)) ,
xB2 =
5
12
+
xS1
2
+
9(1  2xS1)
12(9  2(2↵F + ↵S)(↵F + 2↵S)) .
It is easy to check that xA⇤2 < xS1 < xB⇤2 if and only if xˆ < xS1 < 1  xˆ, where:
xˆ ⌘ 1
6
+
1
12(9  2(2↵F + ↵S)(↵F + 2↵S)) .
If the conditions above are not satisfied, then platforms expect ODS to occur, only towards A if
xS1  xˆ and towards B if xS1   1  xˆ. To prove point (iii), notice how:
@xˆ
@↵S
=   1
(12(9  2(2↵F + ↵S)(↵F + 2↵S)))2 ( 2(5↵F + 4↵S)) > 0,
@xˆ
@↵F
=   1
(12(9  2(2↵F + ↵S)(↵F + 2↵S)))2 ( 2(4↵F + 5↵S)) > 0.
4.2.3 Proof of Proposition 9
Formally, platform A and platform B set respectively prices pAS1, p
A
F1 and p
B
S1, p
B
F1in order to maximize
inter-temporal profits, i.e., solve:
max
pAS1,p
A
F1
pAS1xS1 + p
A
F1xF1 +  ⇡
A
2 (xS1(p
A
S1, p
A
F1, p
B
S1, p
B
F1)),
max
pBS1,p
B
F1
pBS1xS1 + p
B
F1xF1 +  ⇡
A
2 (xS1(p
A
S1, p
A
F1, p
B
S1, p
B
F1)),
where ⇡A2 =
71+72x2S1 66xS1 36(↵S+↵F )
72 +
9(2xS1 1)(4↵F+2↵S(↵F+2↵S 2)+4xS1 5)
72(9 2(2↵F+↵S)(↵F+2↵S))
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and ⇡B2 =
77+72x2S1 78xS1 36(↵F+↵S)
72   9(2xS1 1)(4↵F+2↵S(↵F+2↵S 2) 4xS1 1)72(9 2(2↵F+↵S)(↵F+2↵S)) are the profits they are
going to receive tomorrow under the assumption of two-direction switching.
From the first-order conditions of this problem, the first period equilibrium prices will be the following:
1. subscription prices equal to: pAS1 = p
B
S1 = cS + 1  ↵F + (3 2↵S ↵F )(↵S ↵F )3(9 2(2↵S+↵F )(2↵F+↵S) ,
2. firms’ prices equal to pAF1 = p
B
F1 = t  ↵S ,
and since platforms charge the same prices, the market symmetrically splits in both sides, i.e., xS1 =
nF1 = 1/2. Consequently, both platforms o↵er introductory prices to new users and TDS occurs, with
corresponding equilibrium prices given by the ones in 7 and. Therefore, the numbers of subscribers
switching from A to B and B to A are the same. In particular, users laying on the interval
 
1
2 ,
2
3
 
will
switch from platform B to platform A and agents in
 
1
3 ,
1
2
 
towards the opposite direction. For what
concerns firms, nothing changes from the first to the second period, as the prices charged to them as well
as the total number of subscribers to each platform remain constant over time. Finally, the inter-temporal
equilibrium profits are given by:
⇧A = ⇧B = ⇧ˆ =
 (126 ↵F (↵F (53 36↵F )+90) (62 126↵F )↵2S (↵F (137 126↵F )+72)↵S+36↵3S)
18(9 2(↵F+2↵S)(2↵F+↵S))
+ 9(2 ↵F ↵S)+(9 2(↵F+2↵S)(2↵F+↵S))18(9 2(↵F+2↵S)(2↵F+↵S)) .
(4.4)
4.2.4 Proof of Proposition 10
A simple comparison of prices under BBPD (Propositions 8 and 9) with the ones with ban on BBPD
(equation (2.4)) gives:
(i) pjF1 = p
j
F2 = cF + 1  ↵S = p¯jF with j = {A,B},
(ii) cS +
1
3
  ↵F| {z }
pjjS2
< cS +
2
3
  ↵F| {z }
pjj
0
S2
< cS + 1  ↵F = p¯jS where j 6= j0,
(iii) pjS1 = cS + 1  ↵F +  (↵S ↵F )(3 2↵S ↵F )3(9 2(2↵F+↵S)(↵F+2↵S))
(
> cS + 1  ↵F = p¯jS if ↵S > ↵F ,
< cS + 1  ↵F = p¯jS otherwise.
For the result in point (iv), let us just compare BBPD profits in (4.4) and benchmark profits in (2.4).
The di↵erence between the two:
⇧ˆ  ⇧¯ = ↵F+↵S2  
✓
 (↵F (↵F (36↵F 19) 72)+2(63↵F 5)↵2S+(↵F (126↵F 43) 90)↵S+36↵3S+36)
36(↵F+2↵S)(9 2↵F ↵S)
◆
is always negative under the assumption of single-homing ( 1 > max{↵S ,↵F }) and concave profits
(1 > 2(↵S + ↵F )2). oth firms and end-users expect platforms to use within-group price discrimination
and take it into account when taking their ex-ante decisions.
4.3 Appendix of Chapter 3
4.3.1 Proof of Proposition 11
⇢¯(DInv1 ) is increasing and  b(D
Inv
1 ) is decreasing in D
Inv
1 . All the results of Proposition 11 depend on
the e↵ect of all the variables on the number of investors DInv1 = n(1    )(1   p1)
P
k k
f(k). We clearly
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have the following partial derivatives:
@DInv1
@p1
=  n(1   )
X
k k
f(k) < 0, (4.5)
@DInv1
@
P
k k
f(k)
= n(1   )(1  p1) > 0. (4.6)
From Equation (4.6) we can conclude that any variable a↵ecting k a↵ects the number of investors in
the opposite way. According to the inequality in (3.6), k changes in response to a change in b, C,   or
p2. An increase in b or   makes people with a lower degree willing to invest, since the incentives become
higher for each degree level. This implies that the minimal degree for investment decreases. Conversely,
k increases in response to a rise in C or p2. A consequence is that the number of investors DInv1 increases
in response to a rise in b and decreases when C, p2 or p1 become lower. From the same reasoning follow
the signs of the e↵ects on the di↵usion of information ⇢¯ and on the probability of getting the bonus  b.
  instead has a non monotonic e↵ect on the number of investors. Let us assume to move the proportion
of investors from   to  0, with  0 >  . This will make the cuto↵ move from k to k   1, as expectations
about the number of bonuses are revised upward (more potential buyers and fewer potential competitors).
By computing the variation in the number of investors, we get:
DInv1 ( 
0) DInv1 ( ) = n(1   0)(1  p1)
X
k k 1
f(k)  n(1   )(1  p1)
X
k k
f(k). (4.7)
The di↵erence in 4.7 is positive if the following inequality holds:
(1   0)f(k   1)    0    . (4.8)
and it is negative if this is reversed. The sign of the inequality above will determine the sign of the
e↵ect of an increase in   on the two functions ⇢¯ and  b.
4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The demand in the second period is composed of two parts. D22 is the demand coming from newly
informed people while D12 represents the number of early informed people buying the good in time 2. We
have:
D2 = D
2
2 +D
1
2 =  (1  p2)⇢¯n+ (1   )(1  p2)n. (4.9)
Computing the partial derivatives yields the result:
@D2
@b
=  (1  p2)n@⇢¯
@b
> 0 since
@⇢¯
@b
> 0, (4.10)
@D2
@p1
=  (1  p2)n @⇢¯
@p1
> 0 since
@⇢¯
@p1
< 0, (4.11)
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@D2
@p2
=   ⇢¯n  (1   )n < 0, (4.12)
@D2
@ 
= (1  p2)⇢¯n @⇢¯
@ | {z }
ambiguous
+(1  p2)n(⇢¯  1)| {z }
<0
. (4.13)
4.3.3 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Let us define ⇡⇤2(k) as the maximised second period profits for a given cuto↵ k. These profits
are maximised in the sense that p2 and b are chosen optimally under the constraint that the monopolist
wants a share
P
k k
f(k) of old buyers to invest.
To explicitly find out this function, let us maximise the profit for given k. We will do it in three steps:
(i) Choice of the bonus. Since the bonus b represents a cost for the monopolist, the optimal b to obtain
a given k is the one such that the constraint above is binding, i.e.,
b(k) =
C
(1  p2)  b(k)k , (4.14)
where the subscript (k) means that bk generates k. Consequently, choosing such a b, we obtain
⇡ (k, p2) =
✓
p2   C
(1  p2)  b(k)k
◆
 (1  p2)⇢¯(k)n+ p2(1   )(1  p2)n, (4.15)
which is the profit that would be obtained by setting a bonus generating cuto↵ k.
(ii) Choice of the price. The price that maximises ⇡ (k, p2) is the solution to:
max
p2
⇡ (k, p2) . (4.16)
The first order condition of the problem above requires that (1  2p2)
⇣
 ⇢¯+1  
 ⇢¯
⌘
= 0 or simply
p⇤2 =
1
2 .
(iii) maximised profit. Plugging p⇤2 into equation (4.14) and into (4.16) we find:
⇡⇤(k) =

 
4
  C
 b(k)k
 
n⇢¯(k) +
(1   )n
4
(4.17)
and
b⇤ =
2C
  b(k)k
. (4.18)
To conclude the proof, since the function ⇡⇤(k) can take a finite number of values as k 2 {1, 2, ..., n  1}
one of them is the maximum. We call k⇤ the cuto↵ leading to this maximal value.
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